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ABSTRACT 
 
Elephant ivory is a rare and sought after commodity that has been traded for centuries in many 
ancient civilisations. Over time, the growing demand for ivory led to sharp declines in African 
elephant populations. The devastating effects of the ivory trade therefore raised concerns 
amongst the international community. After much deliberation, the idea came about to create 
a convention that would regulate the wildlife trade, which included the ivory trade.  
 
In 1975, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) came into force with the aim of ensuring that the international wildlife trade did not 
threaten the survival of certain endangered species in the wild. Every two to three years, Parties 
to CITES meet to review the Convention and discuss possible changes. These meetings are 
known as the Conference of the Parties (CoP’s). The CoP is the supreme decision-making body 
of the Convention. In terms of this Convention, species are listed in three different appendices 
depending on the level of threat to their extinction. Appendix I provides the highest level of 
protection by prohibiting all international trade in that species, whilst Appendices II and III 
allow some regulated trade depending on the severity of the threat of extinction. 
 
In 1976, the African elephant was afforded the protection of CITES and listed under Appendix 
II of the Convention. However, elephant populations continued to decline. The growing 
demand for ivory eventually peaked during the 1980s and led to a sharp rise in poaching activity 
which further diminished elephant populations. At the Conference of the Parties seventh 
meeting (CoP 7) in 1989, parties recognised the plight of the African elephant population and 
decided to list the African elephant under Appendix I of the Convention, thereby banning all 
international trade in ivory. This international ban is also commonly referred to as the “ivory 
trade ban.” However, there were a few pro-trade Parties with stable elephant populations such 
as Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa that did not agree with the Appendix I 
listing. Instead they petitioned CITES to list their elephant populations under Appendix II so 
that they would be able to conclude “one-off” ivory sales to CITES approved trading partners. 
These pro-trade Parties were successful in their petition and therefore have their elephant 
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populations listed under Appendix II of the Convention. In addition, two “one-off” sales of 
ivory were approved by CITES which took place in 1999 and 2008.  
 
Since the above-mentioned one-off sales took place, pro-trade Parties have continued to 
petition CITES to conclude further one-off sales, at almost every CoP meeting to date. The 
rationale for concluding one-off sales was to raise funds for elephant conservation and for 
legally obtained ivory to flood the market, thereby removing the need or incentive to source 
ivory by illegal means. Pro-ban Parties, however, believed that the one-off sales of ivory had 
an adverse effect on elephant populations and that all trade in ivory should, therefore, be 
banned. The controversy relating to the African elephant at each CoP has been described as 
acrimonious, and has received much international publicity. The debate about the status of the 
African elephant at each conference illustrates the fact that the international community has 
differing perceptions regarding the conservation paradigm that should be adopted – ranging 
from advocates of “pure-protectionist” approaches on the one hand to supporters of 
“sustainable-use” approaches on the other hand. 
 
This dissertation analyses CITES effectiveness in regulating the ivory trade and preventing 
further elephant population declines. The study focuses specifically on the proposals that were 
submitted and the decisions made at the most recent CITES CoP 17 meeting in 2016, which 
took place in Johannesburg, South Africa. In addition, the study will also analyse the effect of 
decisions made at CoP 17, on the elephant ivory trade in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
GENERAL BACKGROUND  
 
“Animals are sentient beings who can suffer and feel pain and therefore humans are obliged 
not to inflict it on them.”1 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The African elephant is the largest land-dwelling animal on Earth,2 and due to its large home 
range and fugitive nature, it moves across African borders in search of food and water.3 Unlike 
the Asian elephant, the tusks of the African elephant are larger, stronger4 and are easily carved 
into decorative items.5 As such, “human greed for trinkets and dubious tonics”6 has made the 
tusks of the African elephant a highly coveted commodity.7 In order to satiate the growing 
demand for ivory, elephants are killed by poachers, and their tusks are removed.8 The demand 
for ivory has led to the ivory trade, which is the commercial and often illegal trade in elephant 
ivory9 – more specifically the trade in ivory of the African elephant. 
 
The Great Elephant Census (GEC), a pan-African aerial survey conceptualised by 
philanthropist Paul G. Allen and Elephants Without Borders (EWB), conduct standardised 
aerial surveys in order to gather data on the current state of elephant populations in Africa.10 
The census is the largest pan-African aerial survey since the 1970s and continues to collate 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Bentham – English Utilitarian philosopher.  
2 Hutchens, E. ‘The law never forgets: An analysis of the elephant poaching crisis, failed policies, and potential 
solutions’ (2013-2014) 31(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 935. 
3 Kreuter, U.P. and Simmons, T. Economics, politics and controversy over African elephant conservation. In: 
Freeman, M.M.R., Kreuter, U.P, Elephants and Whales: Resources for whom? Switzerland: Gordon and Breach 
Science Publishers (1994) Vol 3, 39. 
4 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 935. 
5 Philip, H. ‘A brief history of the ivory trade in Africa’ 2016 howafrica.com, available at 
http://howafrica.com/a-brief-history-of-ivory-trade-in-africa, accessed on 18 October 2016. 
6 Panjabi, R.K.L. ‘For trinkets, and terrorism: International wildlife poaching in the twenty-first century’ (2014) 
43(1) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 4. 
7 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 935. 
8 Ibid. 
9 English Dictionary. “Ivory trade” http://englishdictionary.education/en/ivory-trade, accessed: 17 October 2016. 
10 Great Elephant Census (GEC) ‘The Census’, undated, greatelephantcensus.com, available at 
http://www.greatelephantcensus.com/background-on-conservation/, accessed on 18 October 2016. 
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valuable data on the status of elephant populations in Africa.11 Elephant population data prior 
to the census has been described as disorganised and limited, but the GEC highlights some key 
milestones in elephant conservation over the years. Their estimate of the number African 
elephants on the continent during the 1500s is 26 million.12 During the 1800s and early 1900s 
poachers however began hunting more aggressively as the demand for ivory increased.13 Since 
then, the African elephant population has been experiencing a catastrophic decline.14 The 
decline is largely due to poaching for ivory, but is also due to other underlying factors such as 
loss of habitat and conflict between humans and elephants.15 However, surges in poaching 
activity meant that the latter factors received less attention.16 The uncontrolled levels of 
elephant poaching and a booming global market in ivory17 pushed the African elephant to the 
brink of extinction.18 
 
The threat to the survival of the African elephant population resulted in international 
agreements being made to prevent further population loss. International agreements regulating 
the trade in ivory were required to establish measures that would effectively address the threat 
to the African elephant population. The leading international agreement regulating global ivory 
trade is the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).19 At 
biennial/triennial meetings, parties that are a signatory to the convention review its 
implementation, and discuss possible changes.20 These meetings are known as CoP 
                                                          
11 Great Elephant Census (GEC) ‘Our Vision’, undated, greatelephantcensus.com, available at 
http://www.greatelephantcensus.com/background-on-conservation/, accessed on 18 October 2016. 
12 Great Elephant Census (GEC) ‘Key milestones in elephant conservation’, undated, greatelephantcensus.com, 
available at http://www.greatelephantcensus.com/background-on-conservation/, accessed on 18 October 2016. 
13 Philip (note 5 above). 
14 Environmental News Service ‘29 African nations urge EU to halt elephant slaughter’, 2016, ens-
newswire.com, available at http://ens-newswire.com/2016/07/04/29-african-nations-urge-eu-to-halt-elephant-
slaughter/, accessed on 17 October 2016. 
15 African Elephant Database. African Elephant Status Report 2016. International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) (2016), available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/7a8w3kk6r9hzm0r/AfESG%20African%20Elephant%20Status%20Report%20201
6.pdf?dl=1, accessed on 17 October 2016 3.  
16 Ibid at 11. 
17 Maddison, J. ‘Everything you ever wanted to know about the illegal ivory trade, as explained by a leading 
elephant expert’, 2016, Animalogic, available at http://community.lovenature.com/blog/everything-you-ever-
wanted-to-know-about-the-illegal-ivory-trade-as-explained-by-a-leading-elephant-expert, accessed on 17 
October 2016. 
18 Mukela, J. ‘Threat to Africa’s elephants a headache for CoP17’, 2016, Mail and Guardian Online, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-23-00-threat-to-africas-elephants-a-headache-for-CoP17, accessed on 17 
October 2016. 
19 Montazeri, S. ‘Protecting the pachyderm: The significance of the ivory trade regulation for African elephant 
conservation’ (2013) 22(121) Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 122. 
20 Barrie, G.N. ‘CITES: A 2005 assessment’ (2006) 182 South African Law Journal 184. 
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(Conference of the Parties) – and in 1989, at the seventh Conference of the Parties (CoP 7), a 
global ban on the trade in ivory was approved.21 The global ban on trade, or the “trade ban,” 
effectively prohibits all international trade in African elephant ivory.22 The trade ban came into 
effect in 1990, and since then levels of poaching fell dramatically and black market prices of 
ivory plummeted – thus allowing elephant populations to recover.23  
 
As elephant populations began to recover, certain southern African countries that were opposed 
to an outright trade ban, attempted to weaken it by petitioning CITES to sell their ivory 
stockpiles.24 There are two types of ivory stockpiles: First, a legal ivory stockpile consisting of 
elephant tusks which have been recovered from elephants that have died natural deaths or due 
to legitimate animal management practices such as culling.25 Second, there is an illegal ivory 
stockpile comprising ivory that was illegally sourced by poachers and has subsequently been 
seized by authorities.26 In 1999, the opposing southern African nations obtained the approval 
of CITES to sell their legal ivory stockpiles in an ‘experimental one-off sale’.27 Despite using 
the term “one-off sale” in 1999 – CITES approved a further one-off sale in 2002, which only 
took place in 2008.28 The rationale for these ‘one-off sales’ was that legal ivory would be 
released in bulk and would flood the ivory market, thus removing the need or incentive to 
source ivory by illegal means.29  
 
According to Hutchens, the one-off sales significantly affected the trade in ivory by revitalising 
the ivory market and re-incentivising poaching.30 Thus the rationale for the one-off sales was 
flawed and failed to produce the desired result. By approving one-off sales during the operation 
                                                          
21 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. ‘CITES &Elephants’, 2013, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service International 
Affairs, available at https://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/CITES-and-Elephant-Conservation.pdf, accessed on 10 April 
2016. 
22 Heltberg, R. ‘Trade bans and wildlife conservation: The case of African elephant ivory’ (1999) 155 (6) 
Agrekon 405. 
23 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 941. 
24 Ibid at 939. 
25 Maddison (note 17 above). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Lemieux, A.M., Clarke, C.V. ‘The international ban on ivory sales and its effects on elephant poaching in 
Africa’ (2009) 49 Brit. J. Criminol 454. 
28 van Kooten, G.C. ‘Elephant economics in the rough: Modelling ivory trade’, unpublished article, University 
of Victoria, Canada, Department of Economics 2005 3, available at https://conservationaction.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Elephant-Economics-in-the-rough.pdf, accessed on 24 May 2018. 
29 Maddison (note 17 above). 
30 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 936. 
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of an ivory trade ban, CITES created confusion and uncertainty regarding its position on the 
international trade in ivory. According to TRAFFIC – the wildlife trade monitoring network – 
140 000 of Africa’s elephants were killed between 2007 and 2014.31 Research by the University 
of California, Berkeley, indicates that the root cause of the rapid increase in poaching activity 
is the one-off sales approved by CITES.32 According to the Berkeley team, these sales removed 
the stigma attached to the trade in ivory that was brought about by the international trade ban 
– thus allowing trade to resume.33 It is thus strongly argued that the one-off sales had an adverse 
effect on the African elephant population.  
 
Opinions are divided on the effectiveness of CITES in terms of protecting the African 
elephant.34 Through the years, many operational and interpretational problems have arisen. The 
more controversial of these were dealt with at the CoP’s.35 The controversy relating to the 
African elephant at each CoP has been described as acrimonious, and has received much 
international publicity.36 The debate about the status of the African elephant at each conference 
illustrates the fact that the international community has differing perceptions regarding the 
conservation paradigm that should be adopted – ranging from advocates of “pure-protectionist” 
approaches on the one hand to supporters of “sustainable use” approaches on the other hand.37 
Despite decisions made at each CoP regarding the protection of the African elephant, the rates 
of elephant killings have reached unprecedented levels in recent years.38  
 
The fact that elephants are being poached at a rate of 8% each year – which is about 104 
elephants a day and approximately 35 000-38 000 each year39 – makes the negotiations 
surrounding the African elephant and ivory trade of paramount importance. The African 
Elephant Status Report (hereafter the “AESR”) produced by the African Elephant Specialist 
                                                          
31 Kings, S. ‘Rhino, elephant, lion fates to be decided at CITES’, 2016, Mail and Guardian Online, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-26-00-rhino-elephant-lion-fates-to-be-decided-at-cites, accessed on 17 October 
2016. 
32 Kings, S. ‘Legal ivory trade led to sharp rise in poaching’, 2016, Mail and Guardian Online, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2016-06-17-00-legal-ivory-trade-led-to-sharp-rise-in-poaching, accessed on 27 
September 2016. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Barrie (note 20 above) at 185. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid at 188. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 151. 
39 Ibid at 122. 
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Group (AfESG) of the IUCN Species Survival Commission (SSC), is an authoritative source 
of source of data regarding the numbers and distribution of African elephant populations across 
the 37 African range States.40 According to AESR 2016, in light of the surge in poaching over 
the past decade, Africa’s elephant population is experiencing the worst continental decline in 
25 years.41 The report, which was released at the CITES Seventeenth Conference of the Parties 
(CoP 17) that took place in 2016 in Johannesburg, South Africa, reveals the truly alarming 
plight of the African elephant.42  
 
Despite efforts being made to effectively regulate the ivory trade, CITES continued to face 
several practical challenges in the implementation of its provisions. Some of the major 
weaknesses are: the non-binding nature of its CoP resolutions,43 the fact that it prohibits supply 
to international markets while domestic markets remain legal,44 and that it relies on its member 
States to pass a national legislative framework to give effect to its resolutions.45  
 
In order for the Convention to be effective in future, there needs to be a coordinated process of 
implementation.46 This process must guarantee, in the long-term, the achievement of the 
Convention’s purpose and objectives by all parties.47 It is important that the international 
community does not lose sight of the main objective of CITES, which is to ensure that the 
international trade in certain species (African elephants) – does not threaten the survival of the 
species in the wild.48 This requires a stringent approach to the trade in ivory, taking into account 
the plight of the African elephant population, the demand for ivory, and factors threatening the 
survival of the population.  
 
                                                          
40 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 2. 
41 Ibid at 3. 
42 International Union for Conservation of Nature. ‘Poaching behind worst African elephant losses in 25 years – 
IUCN report’, 2016, iucn.org, available at https://www.iucn.org/news/poaching-behind-worst-african-elephant-
losses-25-years-%E2%80%93-iucn-report, accessed on 17 October 2016. 
43 Barrie (note 20 above) at 185. 
44 Stiles, D. ‘CITES-approved ivory sales and elephant poaching’ (2009) 45 Pachyderm 152. 
45 Lemieux (note 27 above) at 453. 
46 Barrie (note 20 above) at 189. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 122. 
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If the Convention does not effect the necessary changes or facilitate the ability to do so by 
reaching a definitive approach to elephant conservation in order to achieve its objectives – 
other relevant international instruments may have to be called upon to redress the real and 
perceived shortcomings of CITES.49 The international community should be dedicated to 
effecting a positive change by making every effort to facilitate the recovery of the African 
elephant population before it is too late.  
 
This study is focused on the evolution of the elephant ivory trade and the impact of recent CoP 
negotiations, as it relates to the African elephant population. The dissertation begins by 
discussing the historical background and evolution of the elephant ivory trade. Thereafter, the 
study places the African elephant in context, with a view to understanding the manner in which 
the ivory trade threatens the population’s survival. Further to this, the study will analyse the 
international legal regime regulating the trade in elephant ivory. By conducting such an 
analysis, this study hopes to accurately assess the effectiveness of this legal regime in ensuring 
the survival of African elephant populations. Special attention will be given to the manner in 
which the legal regime is interpreted and applied in terms of South African law.50 The study 
will then focus on CITES CoP proposals and relevant decisions, which have been made in the 
past. The purpose of doing so is to provide a timeline leading up to the recent CoP17 
negotiations – which will be discussed in detail thereafter. Lastly, the dissertation will conclude 
by assessing the potential impact of recent proposals on South Africa, as well as making 
recommendations about the future of the elephant ivory trade.  
 
1.2. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
The elephant ivory trade is one of the main factors threatening the recovery of the African 
elephant population. The rate of poaching over the past decade has crippled elephant 
populations. If the current rate of killing continues, the African elephant may be in danger of 
becoming extinct.51 The motivation to conduct such a study is derived from the plight of the 
African elephant population. Unfortunately, despite it being a topical issue that has received 
                                                          
49 Barrie (note 20 above) at 188. 
50 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 936. 
51 Environmental News Service (note 14 above). 
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international attention, the killing continues. It is thus crucial for the survival of the African 
elephant that a solution be found.  
 
Practical reasons for conducting this study are: As the leading international agreement 
regulating the trade in endangered species, CITES contains provisions to regulate the elephant 
ivory trade. However, parties to the Convention are not adequately enforcing these provisions 
to provide an effective solution to the increasing demand for elephant ivory. Their failure may 
be attributed to the conflicting approaches to elephant conservation adopted by member States: 
a pure-protectionist approach and a sustainable-use approach. The pure-protectionist approach 
prohibits all international trade in elephant ivory, while the sustainable-use approach promotes 
some regulated trade. This divide creates controversy and uncertainty in the international 
community. CITES is also reliant upon each member State to effectively implement national 
legislation. However, “less than half of CITES members have the relevant legislation in 
place”.52 Despite these problems, CITES remains the leading international agreement 
regulating the trade in elephant ivory. Although there is not a dearth of information provided 
or strategies suggested by CITES, there is a serious lack of “coherent, consistent and concrete 
action”53 taken in accordance with such information or strategies. It is therefore important to 
examine CITES and its significance in regulating the trade in elephant ivory. It is also important 
to analyse that CITES CoP negotiations over the years, and how they have contributed to the 
evolution of the legal regime regulating the trade in ivory. Special attention will be given to 
the most recent CoP meeting, CoP17 – with a view to analysing its impact on the future of the 
elephant ivory trade.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The main research question of this study is to ascertain the extent to which recent discussions 
and decisions will impact the future of the African elephant ivory trade in South Africa. In 
attempting to answer this research question, several sub-questions will be asked. This 
dissertation is divided into five chapters containing the relevant sub-questions that are aimed 
at answering the main research question of the study.  
                                                          
52 Panjabi (note 6 above) at 74. 
53 Ibid at 5. 
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Chapter 2 attempts to answer the first sub-question: “What is the elephant ivory trade and how 
is it regulated?” In response to this sub-question, Chapter 2 is divided into two parts and is 
answered in the following manner. Part 1 begins by discussing the evolution of the elephant 
ivory trade. This includes an outline of what the trade is, factors fuelling the trade, the 
consequences of the trade for the African elephant population, and why there is a need for 
international intervention. Part 2 identifies and explains the international legal regime 
regulating the trade in elephant ivory, and the manner in which it has been interpreted and 
applied by member States. As the scope of this study is limited to the South African context, 
an analysis of South Africa’s legal regime regulating the trade in elephant ivory is included. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the following sub-question: “To what extent has COP’s meetings 
contributed to the international legal regime regulating the trade in elephant ivory?” The main 
objective for asking this question, is to assess how past CoP meetings have contributed to 
shaping the international legal regime regulating the trade in elephant ivory. The study briefly 
explains the manner in which CITES CoP meetings are conducted. Thereafter, the study 
outlines relevant decisions made at past CoP meetings. This may be useful, as chapter 4 of the 
study examines the proposals presented at CoP17, as well as their consequences for the trade 
in elephant ivory in future. In essence, this chapter serves as a timeline – identifying relevant 
proposals and decisions of past CoP, leading up to the most recent CoP – namely CoP17.  
 
Chapter 4 attempts to answer the sub-question: “What has been proposed at CoP17 and how 
will it impact the international trade in elephant ivory?” In response to this question, the study 
undertakes the important task of analysing the proposals relating to the elephant ivory trade 
that were made in 2017. This analysis will discuss each proposal individually and will 
determine whether it will be beneficial if adopted. It will thereafter provide an analysis of the 
outcomes of CoP17, as well as the manner in which it may be interpreted and applied by the 
international community. The main aim of the above question is to determine whether 
negotiations regarding the trade in elephant ivory have progressed, or whether this was just 
another wasted opportunity in terms of effectively addressing the crisis faced by the African 
elephant population.  
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Chapter 5 analyses the manner in which the decisions made at CoP17 are likely to be interpreted 
and applied in South Africa. This analysis will discuss South Africa’s approach to the trade in 
elephant ivory, its prospects for future trade, and how the South African elephant population is 
likely to be affected. The study will also identify and make limited recommendations for the 
structure of the South African legal regime currently regulating the trade in elephant ivory. 
This will include possible improvements that may be made to existing legislation to ensure 
effective implementation of CITES. Lastly, the chapter will analyse the effectiveness of CITES 
as a whole, and its ability, or lack thereof, to effectively regulate the trade in elephant ivory. 
The study will also provide an opinion on the best way forward for the future of the trade, and 
how it will prove beneficial to the African elephant population, and this is followed by a 
conclusion.  
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used to pursue the aims and objectives of this study is entirely desk-
top based. Information and data relating to the topic will be derived from primary sources 
(international treaties, CoP proposals and decisions, and relevant legislation) – as well as 
secondary sources (journal articles, text books, text book chapters, internet sources, NGO 
publications, reports from international meetings, and reputable media reports).  
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CHAPTER TWO: PART 1 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ELEPHANT IVORY TRADE 
 
“Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s needs, but not every man’s greed.”54 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In setting out to achieve the objectives of this study, it is useful to begin by discussing the 
historical evolution of the elephant ivory trade. By discussing the historical origins, the study 
can determine exactly why the ivory trade needed to be regulated and when it first took place. 
The chapter will begin by introducing the topic of elephant ivory trade and its historical origins. 
This discussion will focus on African elephant ivory in particular, and the manner in which it 
was traded throughout history. The chapter will thereafter discuss the various factors 
contributing to the declining African elephant population – and the consequences of such a 
decline. In doing so, special attention will be given to the impact that poaching has had on 
African elephant populations.  
 
2.2. ELEPHANT IVORY TRADE 
For this dissertation, references to the ivory trade should be taken to mean the commercial and 
often illegal trade in the tusks of African elephant. 
 
2.2.1. What is ivory? 
The most crucial element in the elephant ivory trade is the tusk of the elephant. The tusk is 
essentially a large incisor that continues to grow as the elephant ages.55 The tusk size, therefore, 
correlates with the age of the elephant.56 Ivory has a unique composition, durability and ability 
to change colour when worked, which makes it a highly versatile substance.57 Possession of 
ivory has always been regarded as a sign of wealth in Europe and North America.58 It is also 
                                                          
54 Mahatma Gandhi. 
55 Chaiklin, M. ‘Ivory in world history – Early modern trade in context’ (2010) 8(6) History Compass 535. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid at 531. 
58 Dobson, A.P. 1995. Conservation and biodiversity. New York: Scientific American Library, 128. 
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an integral part of the Asian culture in the East.59 Ivory is therefore a global commodity that 
has impacted on the ecology, economy and “material culture of most of the inhabited world”.60 
 
2.2.2. Historical evolution of the elephant ivory trade 
It is uncertain when the ivory trade first began; however, evidence suggests that it can be traced 
back to antiquity.61 It was recorded as being traded in various ancient civilisations such as 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece and Rome – and was used as jewellery, furniture and other 
objects.62 According to Parker's report to the US Department of Wildlife and Fisheries on the 
Ivory Trade, ivory was a sought-after commodity in most ancient civilisations, as it was a 
symbol of wealth and “social privilege”.63 During the period of the Roman Empire (27 BCE – 
1453 CE), in particular, ivory was commercially exploited by traders.64 These traders 
established a trade route from Ostia, which was situated at the mouth of the River Tiber, to the 
North African city of Carthage.65 It allowed the Romans to easily export large amounts of ivory 
from northern Africa, until the fall of the Roman Empire in the west in 476 CE.66 Thereafter, 
the ivory trade slowed down for a few centuries, allowing African elephant populations to 
increase.67 Trade however picked up again in the Middle Ages after the rise of the Venetian 
Trading Empire, which was responsible for most of the ivory entering Europe at the time.68 
During this period, ivory was also highly sought after in Asia, and although their supply was 
predominantly obtained from Asian elephants, the high demand resulted in African elephant 
ivory being exported in order to meet the demand.69  
 
During the age of exploration (15th to 17th century), trade in African elephant ivory increased 
significantly.70 Portuguese navigators began exploring the West African coast in the early 15th 
century and set up trading posts along the way.71 On their voyages, they obtained African 
                                                          
59 Dobson (note 58 above) at 128. 
60 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 530. 
61 Thompson, A. ‘The ivory trade in Africa’, 2017, ThoughtCo, available at http://howafrica.com/a-brief-
history-of-ivory-trade-in-africa, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Parker, I.S.C. ‘Commerce in ivory’ in report on The ivory trade: Volume 1 Washington, D.: US Department 
of Fisheries and Wildlife, 1979 3. 
64 van Kooten (note 28 above) at 3. 
65 Trueman, C.N. ‘Ancient Rome and trade’, 2015, The history learning site, available at 
https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/ancient-rome/ancient-rome-and-trade/, accessed on 24 May 2018. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 535. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at 536. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Thompson (note 61 above). 
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elephant ivory through trade rather than through violent pursuits of the commodity.72 By the 
latter part of the 15th century, they had managed to navigate around the Cape and transported 
most of the ivory to Europe.73 The profitability of their trading voyages eventually attracted 
the attention of other European powers – which included Dutch merchants.74 By the early 17th 
century, the Dutch merchants entered the Portuguese trade in Africa and began setting up 
trading posts.75 The Dutch West India Company set up a trading post along the Gold Coast for 
slaves and other African commodities such as ivory.76 The Dutch East India Company explored 
further along the Southern African coast, and took over the trading post from the Portuguese at 
the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.77 This stop was eventually ceded to the British in 1795.78 
 
By the mid-18th century, the demand for ivory in Asia had increased to the extent that Asian 
elephant populations declined.79 As a result, African elephant ivory was exported to various 
ivory carving centres in Asia in order to meet the demand.80 The Dutch and English East India 
Company ships were partially responsible for transporting African elephant ivory into 
Southeast Asia and Japan at the time.81 The demand for ivory also continued to increase in 
Europe into the early 19th century.82 By this time, excessive hunting and habitat loss resulted 
in diminished elephant populations along the West African coastline.83 African hunters 
thereafter travelled further inland in their search of elephants to supply the ivory trade.84 
 
During the colonial era (1885 to 1960), British colonists moved further inland, where they 
began exploiting Central, East and West Africa for ivory.85 According to Parker, Britain’s ivory 
imports between 1800 and 1849 averaged 204 tonnes of ivory annually, between 1850 and 
1899 it was 511 tonnes, and from 1900 to 1914 472 tonnes.86 This sudden expansion into the 
ivory trade began during the second half of the 19th century and took place at the height of the 
                                                          
72 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 536. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid at 537. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Thompson (note 61 above). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 537. 
86 Parker, I.S.C. (note 63 above) at 26. 
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industrial revolution.87 The colonisation of Africa also resulted in rapid globalisation which 
adversely affected elephant populations.88 Human expansion and changes in land use often lead 
to habitat destruction.89 This meant that elephants were restricted to smaller land ranges.90 
Various technological developments such as the introduction of advanced weaponry made it 
easier to kill elephants – not just for ivory, but as a sport.91 This notion of killing for sport was 
known as “trophy hunting”.92 It became increasingly popular among European settlers in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries and contributed to the declining elephant population.93 
 
The increased consumption of ivory in both the East [Asia] and West [Europe] led to sharp 
declines in African elephant populations.94 Consequently, certain measures were taken to 
conserve the African elephant – such as the formation of protected game parks.95 The first of 
these was the Kruger National Park in South Africa, which was established in 1898.96 Various 
elephant protection laws were also promulgated – such as the Cape Act for the Preservation of 
Game in 1886.97 These game laws prevented Africans from hunting on their own accord.98 It 
also limited hunting to those who were in possession of expensive hunting licences – which 
ensured that hunting became a “symbol of European dominance”.99 Despite these measures, 
however, the demand for ivory increased and elephant populations continued to decline well 
into the early 20th century.100 Around 1960, most African States had gained independence and 
began realising the importance of protecting their ivory resources.101 This gave rise to the need 
for legislation that would adequately regulate the ivory trade. However, the legislative 
measures made during this period proved inadequate for regulating the amount of ivory being 
exported.102 This was a cause for concern among many African range States (States with an 
African elephant population)103 – as well as the international community at large. 
                                                          
87 Macgregor, J. ‘The paradoxes of wildlife conservation in Africa’ (1989) 19(4) Africa Insight 202. 
88 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 539. 
89 Macgregor (note 87 above) at 201. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Chaiklin (note 55 above) at 532.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid at 539. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Macgregor (note 87 above) at 203. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Kreuter and Simmons (note 3 above) at 43. 
103 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 11. 
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2.2.3. Need for international intervention 
By the mid-20th century, the devastating effects of the wildlife trade raised concerns among the 
international community.104 This included the ivory trade, which resulted in severely 
diminished African elephant populations. The idea of regulating the wildlife trade was 
introduced and discussed at a meeting of the members of the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (hereafter the “IUCN”) in 1963.105 At the meeting, it was decided that 
a convention would be drafted to regulate the wildlife trade.106 This decision was adopted as a 
resolution to the IUCN meeting, and on 1 July 1975 the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (hereafter referred to as “CITES” or “the 
Convention”) came into force.107 CITES was drafted with the aim of ensuring that the 
international wildlife trade did not threaten the survival of certain endangered species in the 
wild.108 The level of protection that a species is afforded under CITES is determined by a three-
tiered structure termed “Appendices”.109 The degree of threat to the survival of a species 
determines which Appendix it will be listed under.110 
 
In 1976, the African elephant was listed under Appendix II of CITES.111 Under Appendix II, 
the African elephant was afforded an intermediate level of protection, which limits the amount 
of ivory that may be traded internationally.112 Despite the listing, mass killings continued.113 
In 1979, the first Pan-African elephant survey was conducted by Dr Ian Douglas-Hamilton – 
founder of the research and conservation organisation “Save the Elephants” (STE).114 The 
survey revealed an estimated African elephant population of 1.3 million.115 In 1989, a mere ten 
years later, the population reportedly had declined by 50 percent.116 Recognising the need to 
prevent further population loss, the international community intervened by listing the African 
elephant under Appendix I of CITES.117 Under Appendix I, the African elephant was accorded 
                                                          
104 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 131. 
105 CITES ‘What is CITES?’, undated, CITES.org, available at https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php, 
accessed on 5 November 2017. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 122. 
109 Khanna, J, Harford, J. ‘The ivory trade ban: Is it effective?’ (1996) 19 Ecological Economics 149. 
110 Ibid. 
111 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (note 21 above). 
112 Khanna (note 109 above) at 149. 
113 Dobson (note 58 above) at 129. 
114 Save the Elephants (STE) ‘Statistics’, undated, savetheelephants.org, available at 
http://www.savetheelephants.org/project/counting-elephants/, accessed on 11 January 2017. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Great Elephant Census (GEC) website (note 12 above). 
117 Ibid. 
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the highest level of protection by banning all international trade in ivory.118 This ban was 
referred to as “the trade ban”.119 
 
The enactment of a ban on the international ivory trade led to a decrease in the number of 
elephants being killed and allowed elephant populations to recover.120 However, some African 
range States did not support the ban, and instead petitioned CITES to list their elephant 
populations under Appendix II – in order to be able to conduct an experimental “one-off” ivory 
sale.121 In 1977, three African range States – Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe – were 
permitted by CITES to conduct a one-off ivory sale.122 The sale eventually took place in 1999 
and 50 tonnes of ivory was sold to a designated trading partner: Japan.123 According to 
Hutchens, this sale reignited the illegal ivory trade.124 Poaching further escalated when CITES 
approved a second one-off ivory sale in 2002.125 The sale eventually took place in 2008, and 
this time 105 tonnes of ivory from four African range States – Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe – was sold to designated trading partners: China and Japan.126 The one-
off sales created controversy among the international community. Trade sceptics vehemently 
opposed the international sale of ivory, as they believed that it fuelled the demand for ivory 
and led to increased levels of poaching in order to meet the demand.127 
 
2.2.4. Factors contributing to the diminishing African elephant population 
According to the latest AESR report (AESR 2016), the African elephant population across the 
continent was estimated at 415 428 (± 20 111) in areas that have been surveyed.128 There are 
an additional 117 127 to 135 384 elephants in areas that have not been systematically 
surveyed.129 Together, these figures account for 62 percent of the total elephant range.130 There 
are no elephant population estimates for the remaining 38 percent of the total elephant range.131 
                                                          
118 Khanna (note 109 above) at 149. 
119 Great Elephant Census (GEC) website (note 12 above). 
120 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 943. 
121 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 134. 
122 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (note 21 above). 
123 Lemieux (note 27 above) at 454. 
124 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 943. 
125 van Kooten (note 28 above) at 3. 
126 US Fish and Wildlife Service (note 21 above). 
127 Orr, T. ‘Re-thinking the application of sustainable use policies for African elephants in a changed world’ 
(SAIIA Occasional Paper 241; 2016) 13. 
128 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 3. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
17 
 
The report also showed that the continental total of African elephants has declined since the 
last AESR report that was released in 2007.132 The decline amounted to 104 000 in 2007, and 
114 000 in the latest report.133 
 
Population losses may be attributed to factors such as loss of habitat, human-elephant conflict 
resulting in habitat loss, and, most importantly, poaching.134 These factors are included in the 
first three objectives of the African Elephant Action Plan (AEAP).135 The AEAP is a “joint 
conservation policy created by all 37 African range States to coordinate on what actions must 
be taken to effectively conserve their elephant populations.”136 The above-mentioned figure 
that represents the most recent estimate of the African elephant population is alarming. It 
suggests that a concerted effort needs to be made to prevent further population loss. In doing 
so, it is necessary that factors contributing to the diminishing elephant population are 
adequately dealt with, by enforcing incentives such as the AEAP. Each of these factors will be 
alluded to briefly. For this study, however, emphasis will be placed on poaching. 
 
2.2.4.1. Poaching 
“Poaching” is defined as the “illegal taking of wildlife and plants protected by national and/or 
international laws and conventions”.137 This includes the illegal killing of elephants for ivory. 
Poaching has contributed dramatically to declining elephant populations. This was confirmed 
by AESR 2016, which identified poaching as the main reason for the latest decline in elephant 
populations.138 Although poaching losses have been reported across the continent, each region 
faces different threats and challenges.139 In central Africa, political insecurity and a lack of 
governmental control resulted in increased levels of poaching and population loss.140 East 
Africa had mixed results, which indicated drastic population loss in some States and increases 
in others.141 The region had a 50 percent reduction in its elephant population – which was 
primarily attributed to poaching in Tanzania.142 The other States in the region such as Uganda, 
                                                          
132 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 3. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 955. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Biegus, O., Bueger, C. ‘Poachers and pirates – improving coordination of the global response to wildlife 
crime’ (2017) 60 SA Crime Quarterly 30. 
138 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 3. 
139 Ibid at 2. 
140 Ibid at 39. 
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18 
 
Kenya, and Rwanda, among others, recorded stable or increasing populations.143 The West 
African region has small fragmented populations of elephants which are increasing overall – 
despite the rapid land transformation in the region.144 The Southern African region has the 
largest population of elephants on the continent.145 Large elephant populations mean that the 
region has always been faced with various conservation challenges, including increased 
poaching in recent years.146 The States in this region that have been most affected by the threat 
of poaching are: Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Zambia.147 
 
The AESR also relies on systematic information from MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of 
Elephants), which was established under CITES 1997 as a system to track illegal activities 
involving elephants, such as poaching.148 MIKE indicated that poaching levels have risen 
above the sustainability threshold (where more than half of the dead elephants found are 
deemed to have been killed illegally).149 The information from MIKE corresponds with data 
released on UN World Wildlife Day, which revealed that at least 60 percent of elephant deaths 
are at the hands of poachers.150  
 
The surge in poaching activity is driven by several factors: the high value of ivory on the 
international market, the renewed demand for ivory, and the potential for vast enrichment when 
traded illegally.151 The last factor pertains to the illegal ivory trade and forms part of a wider 
international issue, that is, Transnational Environmental Crime (hereafter ‘TEC’).152 TECs are 
“criminal activities undertaken by persons acting across national borders including illegal 
logging and timber smuggling, species smuggling, the black market in ozone depleting 
substances, illegal movement of toxic and hazardous waste etc.” 153 In addition, TEC may also 
                                                          
143 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 91.  
144 Ibid at 201. 
145 Ibid at 138. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 CITES ‘MIKE and ETIS’, undated, CITES.org, available at https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike_etis.php, 
accessed on 5 November 2017. 
149 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 29. 
150 Carrington, D. ‘African elephants ‘killed faster than they are being born’, 03 March 2016, The Guardian, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/03/african-elephants-killed-faster-than-they-
are-being-born, accessed on 17 October 2016. 
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be described as a multifaceted enterprise crime that operates alongside a legal market and 
involves a range of actors.154 The illegal ivory trade is categorised as a TEC as it involves 
trading in endangered species and is multifaceted in the sense that it is constituted by other 
crimes, such as poaching.155 In most cases, the parties involved in the commission of the 
abovementioned TEC belong to organized crime groups such as, criminal gangs, corrupt 
military units, members of various militias, and terrorist groups.156 These groups often display 
the characteristics of organized crime groups when acquiring and trafficking in wildlife.157 
Characteristics include: the use of violence, corruption and extortion.158 All of which can 
jeopardise the existence of a species and greatly undermine the law enforcement capacities of 
the States involved.159 The increased threat of TECs therefore attracted the attention of the 
international community and in 2014, the United Nations Security Council – acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 160 – noted TECs in its resolution.161 The resolution noted that 
“illicit natural resource exploitation, including wildlife poaching, were destabilising forces in 
the Central African Republic” and encouraged the State to take the necessary action to address 
the issue.162 Various subsequent resolutions have also noted the issue.163 However, it is 
apparent that TECs, like the illegal ivory trade, are still not being treated with sufficient 
seriousness by the national and international community, who tend to prioritise traditional 
organised crimes such as human and drug trafficking.164 This could be due to three reasons; 
firstly, TECs are governed by a different treaties, each with its own provisions, making it 
difficult for States to keep up with implementation and enforcement.165 An example of this is 
the wildlife trade, which includes the illegal ivory trade, and is governed CITES, and waste 
                                                          
154 Wright (note 152 above) at 339. 
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disposal, which is governed by the Basel Convention.166 167  Secondly, unlike drugs and human 
trafficking which are expressly prohibited forms of organised crime, trade in certain natural 
resources are not expressly prohibited.168 The presence of a legal market for some natural 
resources often makes it difficult for authorities on the ground to be able to distinguish between 
what is being traded legally and illegally.169 Lastly, TECs are often perceived as “victimless 
crimes” which results in States allocating fewer resources for their prevention.170 This is 
evident in the illegal ivory trade where organised crime groups are often heavily armed and, in 
most cases, are better equipped than local park rangers.171 During the past decade, over 1 000 
park rangers lost their lives attempting to prevent poaching incidents.172 This figure indicates 
a lack of training given to park rangers and weak law-enforcement measures.173 To address the 
situation on the ground, States need to perceive TEC as a “serious issue” and understand the 
consequences of failing to allocate adequate resources to combat them.174 It is therefore 
important that States effectively implement, comply with, and adequately enforce the relevant 
environmental laws and multilateral agreements, such as CITES. 
 
2.2.4.2. Human-elephant conflict 
Human-elephant conflict is broadly defined as “any human-elephant interaction which results 
in negative effects on human social, economic or cultural life, on elephant conservation or on 
the environment”.175 Conflict arises when humans and elephants compete for the same scarce 
resources – food, water and land.176 Human-elephant conflict is also closely linked to other 
factors contributing to the declining population, such as habitat loss and poaching. Habitat loss 
often results in a reduced range area for African elephants and confines them to certain areas 
of suitable habitat.177 Due to their range area being so small, they often come into contact with 
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humans, which may, at times, lead to conflict.178 Conflict occurs when the elephants directly 
or indirectly harm humans.179 This often occurs in rural communities.180 These communities 
then begin regarding elephants as a nuisance and turn a blind eye to or even assist poaching 
groups.181 Human-elephant conflict is therefore a crucial contributing factor to the declining 
elephant population, and is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon.182 In an attempt 
to prevent conflict, States often rely on communities to assist in managing human-elephant 
conflict by providing incentives.183 These incentives are in the form of funds for rural 
development, which are derived from the sale of ivory.184 Although it is necessary that 
communities collaborate with wildlife enforcement to prevent incidents of human-elephant 
conflict, it is however not necessary that these communities benefit from the sale of ivory.185 
African States should, instead, adopt alternative approaches that support rural development and 
do not include the sale of ivory.186 At meetings of the Conference of the Parties to CITES 
(CoP), India agreed to share their knowledge on methods to assist preventing human-elephant 
conflict, without recourse to the sale of Asian elephant ivory.187 Violence-free alternatives 
include, among others, fencing, the use of bees/the sound of bees as a deterrent, chilli-based 
repellents on crops, and land-use planning and community conservation initiatives that do not 
include initiatives derived from the sale of ivory.188  
 
2.2.4.3. Loss of habitat 
Though it is not the foremost threat to the African elephant population, loss of habitat is a 
crucial factor contributing to population loss. Loss of habitat occurs due to factors such as 
human development, and rapid urbanisation or expansion of agriculture that takes place over 
extended periods of time.189 It is therefore classified as a long-term threat to elephant 
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populations.190 African elephants are nomadic in nature,191 and as a result they occupy a wide 
range of habitats such as near-desert environments, semi-arid savannah ecosystems and tropical 
forests.192 These varying habitats have resulted in the evolution of two distinct African elephant 
populations – the Savannah elephant and the forest elephant.193 Both populations suffer from a 
loss of habitat due to one or more of the above-mentioned factors. Loss of habitat can be 
determined by examining the range area of the African elephant. The AESR 2016 defines the 
range area of elephants as “the entire area where the species occurs in the wild at any time”.194 
According to the AESR 2016, the continental elephant range area is currently estimated at 
3 312 238 km2.195 This is a slight change from the estimated continental range area in the 
previous report (AESR 2007).196 The AESR 2007 reported an estimated range area of 3 335 
827 km2, which was 32 percent less than the range area in the previous report (AESR 2002).197 
Since habitat loss is a long-term threat, a reduction in the elephant range area can only be 
observed over long periods of time. However, according to the CITES CoP 17 proposal, the 
available elephant range area has already shown a steady decline.198  
 
2.2.5. Consequences of the diminishing African elephant population 
It is crucial to the survival of the African elephant population that each factor threatening its 
survival is effectively dealt with in order to prevent further population loss. Failure to do so 
may have dire consequences, as the African elephant is regarded as a keystone species.199 Both 
forest and savannah elephants play important roles in their respective landscapes.200 Their 
grazing methods enable smaller species of animals to gain access to food and materials more 
readily.201 They also promote plant distribution and act as seed dispersers. 202 This may be their 
                                                          
190 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 2. 
191 Kreuter and Simmons (note 3 above) at 39. 
192 CITES ‘Consideration of proposals for amendment of Appendices I and II: Submitted by Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka 
and Uganda’, CoP 17 2016 , available at https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-
Prop-16.pdf, accessed on 24 June 2017 3. 
193 Lindsay (note 184 above) at 261. 
194 AESR 2016 (note 15 above) at 18. 
195 Ibid at 31. 
196 Ibid at 34. 
197 Ibid at 21. 
198 CITES ‘Consideration of proposals for amendment of Appendices I and II: Submitted by Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka 
and Uganda’, CoP 17 2016, available at https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-
Prop-16.pdf, accessed on 24 June 2017 6. 
199 IUCN website (note 177 above). 
200 Panjabi (note 6 above) at 21. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
23 
 
most important role yet – as plant distribution not only benefits other species of animals, but 
also humans who rely on these habitats for certain vegetation.203 Without the presence of 
African elephants, a vital mechanism in the ecosystem goes missing.204 This leads to what is 
known as “empty forest syndrome,” which occurs when animals disappear at a faster rate than 
their habitats.205 The ecological contribution of the African elephant is therefore invaluable to 
the ecosystems within which they reside.206  
In an attempt to ensure the survival of the African elephant population, the international 
community adopted CITES as the leading international convention regulating the ivory trade, 
and this will be discussed further in Part 2 of this chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO: PART TWO 
LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING THE ELEPHANT IVORY TRADE 
 
“The world is a dangerous place to live in, not because of the people who are evil, but because 
of the people who don’t do anything about it.”207 
 
2.3. INTRODUCTION 
According to Bodansky, the primary focus of international environmental law is to regulate the 
interaction between human beings and the natural world.208 International environmental law 
seeks to address changes to the natural world that are induced by humans – such as pollution.209 
This purpose of this chapter is to discuss the international legal regime regulating the elephant 
ivory trade. The chapter will start by discussing the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). This discussion will briefly examine 
the historical origins and application of the Convention in greater detail. The study will 
thereafter examine how CITES, as an international treaty, is applied at a national level in the 
South African context. Lastly, the chapter will conclude by assessing how effectively the 
Convention has been implemented by Parties. 
 
2.4. INTERNATIONAL REGIME GOVERNING THE ELEPHANT IVORY TRADE 
 
2.4.1. Historical origin of CITES  
Environmental awareness among the international community in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
resulted in the idea of regulating the international wildlife trade.210 This idea was initially put 
forward at a meeting of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (hereafter referred 
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to as ‘IUCN”) General Assembly in 1963.211 The IUCN is the oldest global environmental 
organisation that helps find practical solutions to “pressing environmental and development 
challenges.”212 At an IUCN Conference in 1972, the idea of regulating international wildlife 
was researched and discussed further.213 During the conference, members made the 
recommendation to draft a Convention that would regulate wildlife trade.214 However, this 
recommendation was met with opposition from developing African countries led by Kenya.215 
These developing countries proposed that each country should reserve the right to determine 
which of its species would be classified as tradeable under the Convention – as opposed to a 
list being drawn up with the advice of experts appointed by the Convention.216 
 
After much discussion, two proposals emerged during the IUCN Conference, which were later 
consolidated into a draft text of the Convention.217 The final text of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was agreed upon 
and signed into existence on 3 March 1973 in Washington, DC by representatives of 80 
countries.218 The Convention thereafter entered into force on 1 July 1975.219 It has since been 
hailed as the “magna carta” for the international regulation of wildlife trade.220 It is also seen 
as one of the “Big Five species-specific treaties.”221 
 
2.4.2. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES)  
CITES is an international agreement/treaty, entered into between various States around the 
world.222 At present, there are 183 States that have agreed to be bound by the Convention and 
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this is growing.223 These States are referred to as ‘Parties’ as per the text of the Convention.224 
As mentioned in Part 1 of this chapter, the objective of the Convention is to ensure that the 
trade in any specimen of plant or wildlife does not threaten its existence, to the extent that it is 
in danger of becoming extinct.225 CITES therefore contains a legally binding framework 
regulating the international trade of specimens listed under the Convention.226 This framework 
involves imposing controls on the import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea of 
species listed under the Convention.227 Controls imposed on the trade of listed species takes 
the form of a licensing/permit system.228 
 
2.4.2.1. Permit system 
In terms of Article IX Paragraph 1 of the Convention, each Party is obliged to appoint one or 
more Management and Scientific Authorities.229 The Management Authority of a State is 
responsible for administering the permit system.230 Its primary task is to ensure that any 
specimen that is to be traded, has been legally obtained and that its import or export will not be 
detrimental to the survival of the species.231 The Scientific Authority serves an advisory role to 
the Management Authority, and is responsible for providing advice on the effects of the trade, 
on the status of any particular species listed under the Convention.232 In a sense, one authority 
acts as a check on the other to ensure that the issuing of permits and certificates is reasonable, 
and in accordance with the Convention.233  
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2.4.2.2. Appendices to CITES  
Species listed under the Convention are categorised under a “three-tiered structure”.234 This 
three tiered structure is included within the text of the Convention, and is referred to as the 
‘Appendices’.235 Each Appendix provides a different level of protection that may be accorded 
to a specimen.236 The levels of protection depend on the severity of the measures that would be 
required to ensure the survival of a species.237  
 
Appendix I  
Appendix I includes species that are threatened with extinction and are/or may be affected by 
the ongoing or potential trade in such species.238 Species categorised under this Appendix are 
afforded the highest level of protection under the Convention, and any trade under this category 
is strictly monitored and may only be authorised in exceptional circumstances.239  
 
Appendix II 
Appendix II includes species that are not necessarily threatened with extinction. However, their 
position is such that unless trade is restricted and strictly regulated, they may become 
vulnerable to extinction due to increased utilisation that is incompatible with their survival as 
a species.240  
 
Appendix III  
Appendix III offers the least protection.241 It also operates using a different listing procedure 
to Appendix I and II.242 Appendix III includes species that have been identified by any member 
of CITES as requiring protection from over-exploitation, and is thereafter regulated within the 
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jurisdiction of such a State.243 By placing a species under the protection of this Appendix, 
members gain the co-operation of other State members in the effort to restrict and prevent the 
over-exploitation of trade in certain species.244 
 
2.4.2.3. Obligations of Parties to the Convention 
To achieve the objectives of the Convention, CITES created a set of guidelines or provisions 
to regulate the international wildlife trade.245 However, as a non-self-executing treaty, it relies 
on States to enact legislation that gives effect to its provisions.246 A State attracts the obligation 
to implement the provisions of CITES by ratifying the Convention.247  
 
Though the Convention does not specifically dictate how each Party should implement its 
provisions, it does, however, provide a framework to assist Parties in fulfilling their 
obligations.248 As a general rule to achieve the objectives of the Convention, Parties must abide 
by Article II paragraph 4, which states that:  
“The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III 
except in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.”249  
The above quote therefore means that Parties must enact national legislation that regulates the 
trade of listed species, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Further to this, 
Parties must, in accordance with Article VIII Paragraph 1, include provisions that criminalise 
and enforce any violation of the Convention.250 Article VIII Paragraph I reads as follows: 
“The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present 
Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include the 
following measures:  
 (a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and  
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 (b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.”251 
It is up to State Parties to interpret how to implement these provisions of the Convention.252 
Many critics of the Convention argue that the freedom to interpret how the provisions of the 
Convention are implemented – greatly diminishes its effectiveness.253 This may be due to the 
fact that varied interpretations often lead to different enforcement procedures and punishments 
among States.254 In some cases, States may fail to enact legislation that gives effect to the 
Convention.255 According to Panjabi, since CITES entered into force in 1975, less than half of 
its Parties have implemented national legislation.256 Despite the fact that it is legally binding 
on Parties to implement the provisions of the Convention – CITES lacks the ability to impose 
penalties on non-compliant Parties.257  
 
Parties to the Convention therefore play a pivotal role in ensuring its effectiveness.258 A 
problem remains, however, in that CITES does not provide for ongoing monitoring to ensure 
that its provisions are being implemented, nor does it provide financial support to help Parties 
fulfil their obligations.259  
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2.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
South Africa has been involved with CITES since it came into force in 1975.260 In fact, South 
Africa participated in the Washington Conference that led to the creation of CITES.261 South 
Africa was also one of the first 15 Parties to ratify the Convention.262  
 
As a Party to the Convention, South Africa is obligated to fulfil certain responsibilities. In 
compliance with its responsibilities, South Africa implemented the Convention’s provisions by 
enacting legislation and systems – to ensure that its indigenous plant and wildlife populations 
are protected from exploitative trade.263 This is achieved largely by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, which is the “central coordinating and policy making authority” with 
regard to wildlife conservation in South Africa and is responsible for ensuring the 
implementation of the Convention.264 
 
2.5.1. National legislation 
 
2.5.1.1. The Constitution of South Africa 
The Constitution of South Africa makes provision for the implementation of international 
agreements that have been ratified by the country.265 The relevant section of the Constitution 
is as follows:  
“Section 231 (4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
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approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament.”266 
The above-mentioned section of the Constitution directs that international agreements be 
enacted into law by national legislation. This section is applicable to CITES – as CITES is a 
non-self-executing international treaty and requires national legislation to be effective.  
 
2.5.1.2. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004) (NEMBA) 
In accordance with Section 231(4)267 of the Constitution of South Africa and the obligations of 
Article VIII of the Convention,268 South Africa enacted the National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004)269 (hereafter ‘NEMBA’).270 NEMBA provides 
for the management and conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity, the protection of species 
and ecosystems that are threatened or require national protection and the sustainable use of 
biological resources.271 The objectives of NEMBA are broadly to:  
“1) Provide for the management and conservation of the country’s biodiversity; 
2) give effect to international agreements relating to biodiversity that have been ratified by 
South Africa such as CITES; 
3) provide for co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations so that State 
departments and functionaries are able to ensure that responsibilities under the convention are 
fulfilled; 
4) provide for the appointment of a Scientific Authority and its operating procedures.”272  
Although NEMBA does not specifically mention CITES, there are several provisions contained 
in the Act that make it clear the international agreement being referred to is CITES.273 
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Examples of the provisions include Sections 5, 51 and 59 of NEMBA.274 According to Section 
5, “the Act gives effect to ratified international agreements affecting biodiversity, to which 
South Africa is a Party, and which bind the Republic.”275 This section gives effect to CITES 
and other conventions affecting biodiversity, such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity,276 which will be discussed briefly later in this chapter. Section 51(c) “gives effect to 
the Republic’s obligation under international agreements regulating international trade in 
specimens of endangered species.”277 This specific provision gives effect to CITES as it 
pertains to agreements regulating the trade in endangered species, but does not specifically 
mention CITES as the international agreement. Section 59 of the Act directs the Minister to 
monitor compliance in South Africa, with an international agreement that regulates the 
international trade in specimens of endangered species.278 In addition, Section 59 also directs 
that the Minister appoint a scientific authority to assist with such monitoring.279 Monitoring 
compliance with the Convention and appointing a scientific authority are some of the key 
obligations required to be fulfilled by Parties to CITES.  It is therefore clear that NEMBA gives 
effect to South Africa’s obligations as a Party and serves as the national legislation 
implementing the Convention. However, NEMBA also relies on provincial nature conservation 
ordinances to enforce the Act’s provisions.280 Examples of these ordinances include: the Natal 
Nature Conservation Ordinance 15 of 1974281 and the Cape Nature and Environmental 
Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974282 – to name but two.283  
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2.5.1.3. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004): 
Threatened or Protected Species Regulations (TOPS Regulations) 
In addition to NEMBA, the Threatened or Protected Species Regulations (hereafter ‘TOPS 
Regulations’) were published in the Government Gazette on 23 February 2007.284 The purpose 
of the TOPS Regulations are to further regulate the permitting system set out in Chapter 7 of 
NEMBA.285 The TOPS Regulations provide a comprehensive process for the application of 
permits to carry out restricted activities286 relating to biodiversity in terms of NEMBA.287  
 
They also include procedures relating to the Authorities that a State Party to CITES is required 
to appoint, namely: the Management Authority and the Scientific Authority. These authorities 
are responsible for ensuring that any trade being conducted, is done in accordance with the 
conditions prescribed by the Convention.288 The Department of Environmental Affairs serves 
as the Management Authority and the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) 
serves an advisory role as the Scientific Authority.289 These authorities have various law-
enforcement officers, Environmental Management Inspectors (EMI) and units for threatened 
species at their disposal – while also working closely with the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) to ensure that the import and export of wildlife and plants is controlled in line with 
legislation.290 Also assisting in the fight against illicit wildlife trade is South Africa’s customs 
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authorities and Department of Agriculture – since the wildlife trade involves various modes of 
transportation that specimens may be smuggled in.291 
 
2.5.1.4. Other conservation initiatives 
South Africa is also an active participant in various other Multilateral Environmental  
Agreements (MEA) other than CITES.292 One such MEA is the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (hereafter ‘CBD’).293 The final text of the CBD was opened for signature on 5 June 
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment Development in Rio de Janeiro, and 
entered into force on 29 December 1993.294 South Africa ratified the CBD on 31 January 1996 
and thereafter became a Party to the Convention.295 The CBD was developed as a response to 
the need for an international legal instrument that would address the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity.296 It does so by means of a three primary objectives contained 
in Article 1 of the Conventions text which are outlined broadly as:  
“1) the conservation of biological diversity; 
2) the sustainable use of its components, and  
3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources…”297 
Whereas CITES is concerned with addressing the specific threat that the wildlife trade poses 
to endangered species, the CBD goes one step further by seeking to protect entire habitats and 
ecosystems, which would further contribute to the protection of all species.298 There is a 
significant amount of overlap in the general aims and objectives of both conventions.299 It is 
therefore, important that both conventions work together to achieve common objectives. To 
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this end, CITES and the CBD signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1996 with 
the aim of encouraging cooperation between both conventions.300  
 
The CBD also plays an important role in South Africa’s national legislation.301 As a Party to 
the CBD, South Africa is required to implement national legislation giving effect to the 
Convention.302 To satisfy this requirement, various provisions contained in the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA) were intended to give 
effect to the CBD and South Africa’s obligations as a Party.303 These obligations include, with 
regard to conservation and sustainable use, national strategic planning, identifying and 
monitoring components of biodiversity, processes and activities likely to have a significant 
adverse impacts, establishing measures, and conducting environmental impact assessments.304 
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
Drafting CITES was regarded as an important step in the right direction for international 
environmental law.305 CITES was successful in providing a practical mechanism to regulate 
the wildlife trade.306 However, there are several critics of the Convention that frequently 
question its effectiveness in being able to enforce its provisions.307 As a non-self-executing 
treaty, CITES is largely reliant on State Parties to enact national legislation implementing its 
provisions.308 If a Party fails to enact the relevant legislation, the Convention cannot be 
enforced nationally.309 This impacts on the Convention’s ability to regulate the wildlife trade 
and leads to other deficiencies in the Convention. First, Parties will not have the necessary 
legislative framework in place to be able to criminalise illegal or restricted activities relating 
to species listed under the Convention. Second, the lack of national legislation often leads to 
an unregulated domestic wildlife trade.310 Last, the presence of national legislation in one 
country and the lack thereof in another – results in some States being targeted by organised 
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wildlife crime more than others.311 Bodansky therefore asserts that by CITES encouraging 
Parties to fulfil their obligations under the Convention, this merely amounts to “words on 
paper”, and will not be sufficient to ensure that the provisions of the Convention are effectively 
enforced.312 It is necessary that CITES amend its provisions to encourage compliance with the 
provisions of the Convention, ongoing monitoring of compliance with the provisions the 
Convention, and must make provision for financial assistance to State Parties to effectively 
implement the provisions of the Convention. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADDRESSING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM – THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
STATUS OF THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT AT EACH COP 
 
“The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way its animals are 
treated” 313 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its entry into force in 1975, CITES has provided an international platform for Parties to 
the Convention and NGOs to deliberate on matters threatening the survival of endangered 
plants and animals. These discussions take place at a Conference of the Parties (CoP).314  This 
chapter will discuss how the CoP have contributed to shaping the international legal regime 
regulating the elephant ivory trade. The chapter will begin by discussing the Conference of the 
Parties. It will then identify significant decisions taken at each CoP that have impacted on the 
African elephant and the ivory trade. The chapter will then conclude by assessing the 
effectiveness of these decisions and their impact on the international legal regime regulating 
the elephant ivory trade.  
 
3.2. THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (CoP)  
The Conference of the Parties (CoP) is a collective body of Parties to the Convention and is 
the “supreme decision-making body” of the Convention.315 This means that once a State 
becomes a Party to the Convention, that State is automatically included in the CoP and its 
decision-making process. The CoP meets every two to three years – and has been doing so 
since the first CoP that took place in 1976. 316 Each CoP takes place over a period of two weeks 
and is hosted by a different State Party. 317 The CoP provides Parties with a platform to review 
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the overall application of the Convention and to discuss any potential amendments to the list 
of species published under the Convention's Appendices.318  
 
3.3. TIMELINE TO CoP 17 
Since the first Conference of the Parties (CoP 1)319 that took place in 1979 in Bern, Switzerland 
– Parties have consistently submitted proposals regarding the African elephant. This constant 
submission of proposals has contributed to shaping the international legal regime governing 
the ivory trade and will continue to do so in future. To understand this regime, it is necessary 
to discuss significant decisions taken at past CoP meetings. 
 
3.3.1. CoP 1 – Bern, Switzerland (1976)  
The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 1)320 marked a turning point in the 
history of the elephant ivory trade.321 A proposal was put forward by Switzerland to list the 
African Elephant under Appendix II of the Convention.322 Parties present at the meeting 
accepted the proposal, which resulted in the African elephant being listed under Appendix II.323 
Although the Appendix II listing offered a higher level of protection, it still allowed for trade 
in certain circumstances – which resulted in Parties continuing to trade in ivory.324 
 
CoP 1 is also significant, as the ‘Berne Criteria’ was established during this meeting.325 The 
Berne Criteria are biological and trade criteria that determine whether a species may be 
included under the Convention, and, if so, under which Appendix it will be categorised.326 In 
their proposals to list a species under the Convention, Parties had to show that the Berne 
Criteria have been satisfied.327 Proposals aimed at amending the listing of a species already 
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listed under the Convention, were also required to satisfy the requirements set out in the criteria. 
The Berne Criteria were operational for several years until the Everglades Criteria replaced 
them in 1994.328  
 
3.3.2. CoP 7 – Lausanne, Switzerland (1989)  
The seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 7)329 took place at a time in history 
when rampant poaching threatened elephant populations in Africa.330 A year before the meeting 
took place, certain Parties to the Convention imposed a moratorium on all ivory imports.331 
The Parties that imposed the moratorium were predominantly influential western nations – such 
as France, the USA, West Germany and other European nations.332 The bold decision of these 
influential western nations to impose a moratorium on all ivory imports, exerted pressure on 
the international community to increase the level of protection afforded to the African 
elephant.333 The level of protection was increased the following year at the CoP 7, meeting 
when the Republic of Austria put forward a proposal to amend the listing of the African 
elephant by transferring it from Appendix II to Appendix I.334 Appendix I affords species the 
highest level of protection by banning all international trade in any species listed under it.335 
According to the Austrian proposal, it was hoped that the Appendix I listing would allow 
African elephant populations to recover. 336 The proposal satisfied the Berne Criteria, as 
established in the first meeting of the Parties, which meant that the African elephant would 
qualify for an Appendix I listing.337 The proposal was adopted at the meeting and the African 
elephant was transferred to Appendix I, which banned all international commercial trade in 
ivory.338 The listing became effective on 18 January 1990 and gave rise to the well-known 
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ivory trade ban.339 The decision to impose an ivory trade ban was, for the most part, 
unanimous.340 However, a few southern African countries [South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and Malawi] with strong elephant conservation programmes and stable populations 
refused to support the ban.341 Their main reason for not supporting the ban was their reliance 
on the sale of ivory to source funds for conservation.342  
 
Opinions were divided on whether the ban was successful. According to Hutchens, after the 
ban came into effect, elephant populations began to recover.343 However, Stiles believes that 
although the ban contributed to lowering instances of poaching, the demand persisted – which 
resulted in elephants still being killed.344 The ban was successful to an extent, but was not 
effectively implemented by Parties to the Convention.345 
 
3.3.3. CoP 8 – Kyoto, Japan (1992) and CoP 9 – Fort Lauderdale, the United States of 
America (1994) 
At the eighth and ninth meetings of the Parties, those present were once again faced with a 
question of whether to once again amend the listing of the African elephant under the 
Convention. 
 
At the eighth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 8)346, a proposal (CoP 8 – Proposal 
13)347 was put forward by the following Parties: Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe.348 These Parties sought to transfer their elephant populations from Appendix I to 
Appendix II.349 At the same meeting, a further proposal was put forward by South Africa (CoP 
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8 – Proposal 15)350 to also transfer its populations from Appendix I to Appendix II.351 The 
above-mentioned Parties were opposed to the Appendix I listing and were of the opinion that 
banning the trade in elephant ivory posed a more significant threat to the survival of the African 
elephant, than allowing such trade to continue.352 This is because the ban prevented/reduced 
revenues from the sale of ivory, which would go towards elephant management and enforcing 
strict law-enforcement measures.353 In addition, these opposing Parties believed that the ban 
would make ivory more scarce, which would drive the price upwards and result in increased 
poaching.354 The motivation of the opposing Southern African range States to amend their 
listing, is therefore derived from their approach to conservation. The opposing Parties adopted 
a ‘sustainable-use’ approach to conservation, in terms of which some controlled trade is 
permissible and the proceeds are allocated to elephant conservation.355 Parties in attendance at 
the meeting considered both proposals. However, the proposals were rejected and the elephant 
population of each proponent retained its Appendix I listing.356  
 
At the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 9)357, South Africa once again put 
forward a proposal (CoP 9 – Proposal 15)358 to transfer its elephant population to Appendix II 
of the Convention.359 Upon consideration, the Secretariat recommended that the proposal be 
accepted, provided that the listing of the population was annotated as follows: “For the 
exclusive purpose of allowing trade in specimens other than ivory.”360 Despite the 
recommendation of the Secretariat, the majority of Parties present refused to accept the 
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proposal.361 Krieps writes that in such controversial situations when the survival of a species is 
threatened, most Parties tend to favour a pure-protectionist approach to conservation,362 which 
is what occurred at this meeting. 
 
Sudan also submitted a proposal (CoP 9 – Proposal 16)363 to transfer its elephant population 
from Appendix I to Appendix II.364 The purpose of this proposal was to allow the proponent 
[Sudan] to export specific stockpiles of ivory accumulated by the State.365 The motivation to 
export the stockpiled ivory was the need for funds to conserve elephant populations, as well as 
the need for foreign currency in Sudan.366 Per the recommendation made by the Secretariat of 
the Convention, this proposal was also rejected.367 
 
Another significant decision taken during the CoP 9 meeting was the establishment of new 
criteria to determine the conservation status for listing species under the Convention.368 The 
new criteria were called the ‘Everglades Criteria’ and replaced the ‘Berne Criteria’.369 Many 
Parties to the Convention regarded the Berne Criteria as ‘inadequate’.370 The new criteria made 
provision for new considerations to apply.371 These included “juxtaposing the positive and 
negative aspects of trade, in order to consider whether it might actually be beneficial to the 
conservation of a species for trade to take place”.372  
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3.3.4. CoP 10 – Harare, Zimbabwe (1997) 
At the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 10)373, a crucial decision was taken 
regarding the trade in African elephant ivory. Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe each 
submitted a proposal once again (CoP 10 – Proposals 10.25374, 10.26375 and 10.27376 
respectively) to transfer their elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II.377 The 
objectives of these proposals were: to allow for the disposal of registered stockpiled ivory; to 
allow international trade in trophy tusks for non-commercial purposes; and to allow trade in 
live animals for non-commercial purposes.378 After reviewing the proposals, the Secretariat 
recommended that the proposals be accepted subject to a series of restrictions and 
precautionary measures.379 However, for the proposals to be accepted, a two-thirds majority 
vote by Parties present at the meeting was required.380 Several Parties who were against ivory 
trade opposed the proposals, but the proposals were eventually accepted – having gained the 
requisite number of votes. 381  
The conditions of the sale and precautionary measures were recorded in an amendment to the 
listing and were recorded as follows:  
“To allow Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, to:  
1) export hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes; 
2) export live animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations (Namibia: for non-commercial 
purposes only);  
3) export hides (Zimbabwe only);  
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4) export leather goods and ivory carvings for non-commercial purposes (Zimbabwe only).  
No international trade in ivory is permitted before 18 months after the transfer to Appendix II 
comes into effect (i.e. 18 March 1999). Thereafter, under experimental quotas for raw ivory 
not exceeding 25.3 tonnes (Botswana), 13.8 tonnes (Namibia) and 20 tonnes (Zimbabwe), raw 
ivory may be exported to Japan subject to the conditions established by the Conference of the 
Parties.”382 
The amendment allowed for an experimental “one-off” sale of 59.1 tons of raw ivory to 
Japan.383 The sale eventually went ahead in 1999 and was considered a success.384 A total of 
US$5 million was received from the sale – to be used exclusively for elephant conservation in 
each region.385 
 
The decision which allowed the sale of ivory illustrated the support for a sustainable-use 
approach to conservation. At the previous CoP (CoP 9), Parties adopted a pure-protectionist 
approach by refusing to allow the sale of ivory. These differing approaches to conservation at 
each CoP indicated that the international community was not united when it came to the ivory 
trade.386 
 
3.3.5. CoP 11 – Gigiri, Kenya (2000) 
At the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 11)387, after having its proposals 
rejected at CoP 8 and CoP 9, South Africa put forward yet another proposal (CoP 11 – Proposal 
11.20)388 to transfer its elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II.389 Upon 
consideration, the Secretariat recommended that the proposal be accepted.390 After much 
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deliberation by the Parties, the proposal was accepted and the South African elephant 
population was also listed under Appendix II, with conditions.391  
The Appendix II listing was annotated as follows:  
“South Africa may allow:  
1) trade in hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes;  
2) trade in live animals for re-introduction purposes into protected areas formally proclaimed 
in terms of legislation of the importing country;  
3) trade in hides and leather goods.  
Any trade in raw ivory shall be whole tusks of government-owned stock originating from the 
Kruger National Park, subject to a zero quota. All other specimens shall be deemed to be 
specimens of species included in Appendix I and the trade in them shall be regulated 
accordingly.”392 
 
The decision meant that the South African elephant population was included with the elephant 
populations of Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe under Appendix II of the Convention. 
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe had already concluded a "one-off" sale of ivory to Japan. 
However, as a condition of South Africa’s sale, South Africa was not permitted to trade 
internationally until the 12th meeting of the Parties.393  
 
3.3.6. CoP 12 – Santiago, Chile (2002) 
At the twelfth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 12)394, proposals were submitted 
by several Southern African Parties to conclude further sales of their ivory stockpiles.395 These 
Parties included Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. After considering 
the proposals, only three Parties were permitted to sell their ivory stockpiles.396 The proposals 
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of Botswana (CoP 12- Proposal 6)397, Namibia (CoP 12- Proposal 7)398 and South Africa (CoP 
12 – Proposal 8)399 were accepted, with conditions.400 The sale of the relevant ivory stockpiles 
was only to be permitted on condition that the necessary mechanisms were put in place in each 
of the relevant elephant range States to monitor poaching.401 In each case, an assurance was 
also required from a CITES-approved trading partner that it would control the manner in which 
the ivory was used and prevent its re-export.402  
 
3.3.7. CoP 14 – The Hague, Netherlands (2007) 
At the fourteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 14)403, Botswana and Namibia 
put forward a proposal (CoP 14 – Proposal 4)404 to maintain the populations of elephants of 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe under Appendix II, but to replace the existing 
annotations to that Appendix.405 The proposal was accepted, but unlike the outcome of CoP 12, 
Zimbabwe's elephant population was also included in the newly proposed annotation – which 
allowed Zimbabwe to trade conditionally in ivory.406 In accordance with the annotation, the 
four Parties (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) eventually concluded a second 
“one-off” sale of ivory in 2008 to Japan and China, which were both CITES-approved trading 
partners.407 The proceeds of the sale amounted to approximately US$15 400 000, to be used 
exclusively for the conservation of African elephant populations.408 
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Another important decision made at the meeting was the acceptance of a nine-year moratorium 
on the international sale of ivory.409 Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe agreed 
to the suspension of all international trade in ivory for nine years from the date of the conclusion 
of the second "one-off" sale in 2008.410 The reason for implementing a nine-year moratorium 
was to prevent any further proposals being submitted to trade in ivory.411 The moratorium 
would be in place until the year 2017 – after which Parties would once more become eligible 
to propose being able to trade in ivory.412  
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
The decisions taken at each meeting have contributed to developing the international legal 
regime governing the ivory trade. After discussing many of these decisions, it is important to 
note that Parties continue to remain divided on the approach that should be adopted to ensure 
the safety of African elephant populations.413 The decision to enact the ivory trade ban favoured 
a pure-protectionist approach to elephant conservation. Supporters of this approach were 
mainly States with poor conservation programmes and rapidly declining elephant populations 
due to increased poaching.414 An example of one of these States was Kenya, which suffered 
severe elephant population losses prior to the enactment of the ivory trade ban.415 After 
realising the urgency with which its population needed protection, Kenya, under the leadership 
of President Daniel Arap Moi, set fire to its elephant ivory stockpile.416 Burning the ivory 
stockpile sent a strong message to the international community to preserve African elephant 
populations and to impose a ban on the ivory trade. Supporters of the preservationist approach 
believed that the ban was the only way to ensure the survival of African elephant.417 They 
reasoned that since it was impossible to distinguish legally and illegally obtained ivory, this 
made it easier for illegally obtained ivory to enter the trade.418 Their rationale for imposing the 
ban on ivory trade was, therefore, to restrict the trade in ivory and prevent the over-exploitative 
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use of the African elephant.419 Many Parties believed that the ivory trade ban contributed to 
recovering elephant populations and decreased levels of poaching.  
 
On the other hand, permitting “one-off” sales in ivory favoured a sustainable-use approach to 
conservation, which some Parties believe is necessary to be able to fund conservation efforts. 
Supporters of the sustainable-use approach were predominantly southern African range States 
with stable elephant populations and strong conservation programmes.420 These opposing 
States argued that conserving elephant populations was a major expense, and without revenue 
from the sale of ivory their conservation programmes would have suffered.421 The opposing 
States also argued that the ban reduced the incentive to conserve elephants among rural 
communities that were involved in elephant management.422 In most African range States, 
communities played a role in conserving elephant populations and they were rewarded from 
sales of ivory – but by removing this incentive there was little reason for rural communities to 
actively conserve elephants.423 The opposing States therefore reasoned that the ban undermined 
conservation initiatives by reducing funding and community involvement, which resulted in 
more incidents of poaching.424  
 
The lack of agreement on the correct approach to be adopted, largely stems from the beliefs of 
the opposing southern African Parties that CITES promotes a “western preservationist 
idealism”, which does not take into account African cultures and values.425 In doing so, CITES 
“prioritizes western values,” which views the elephant as a keystone species that must be 
preserved whereas it may be viewed as a source of food and wealth in Africa.426 The lack of 
consensus among the international community therefore leads to confusion about whether trade 
in ivory should be permitted. This impacts on the manner in which Parties apply the provisions 
of the Convention at a national level, as well as the manner in which each Party deals with the 
conservation of its elephants.427 Although the Convention strikes a balance between pure-
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protectionist and sustainable-use approaches to conservation, it is necessary that Parties adopt 
a single approach – to ensure uniform implementation of the Convention’s provisions and 
similar conservation measures. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
COP 17 
 
“At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the 
worst.”428 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the account of past CoP meetings discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter 
discusses the events of the most recent CoP 17 meeting. CoP 17 took place at a pivotal time 
for African elephant populations. The meeting coincided with the publication of the 16th 
African Elephant Status Report (AESR 2016).429 The AESR 2016 alerted the international 
community to the continental decline in African elephant populations and the urgency of the 
poaching threat. With the publication of the report being so close to the date of the CoP 17 
meeting, it came as no surprise that the status of the African elephant was once again on the 
agenda. The meeting also took place a year before the CITES moratorium on ivory trade ended 
(2017).430 The end of the moratorium meant that Parties could once again submit proposals to 
trade their ivory stockpiles internationally. The meeting therefore played a significant role in 
the future of the African elephant population and the status of the commercial trade in elephant 
ivory. This chapter discusses the proposals and working documents relating to the African 
elephant and ivory trade that were put forward at the CoP 17 meeting. It does so by assessing 
the contents of each proposal and working document, the discussions surrounding them, and 
the decisions adopted. 
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4.2. CoP 17’S HOST COUNTRY 
The seventeenth meeting of the Parties (CoP 17) took place from 24 September to 5 October 
2016 in Johannesburg, South Africa.431 As a country that has been a Party to the Conference 
since its inception in 1975, the opportunity to host the Conference on South African soil held 
great significance. 432 The CITES Secretary-General at the time, John E. Scanlon, even added 
that South Africa was the ideal location to host the seventeenth Conference of the Parties (CoP 
17) due to its consistent participation in the endeavours of the Convention, commitment to 
conservation of its natural wildlife, and the vast number of indigenous species in South Africa 
listed under the Convention.433 One of those listed species is the African elephant. South Africa 
is one of 37 African elephant range States, with an estimated elephant population of ± 
18,841.434 
 
4.3. CoP 17 PROPOSALS AND WORKING DOCUMENTS 
During CoP 17, various proposals and working documents relating to the African elephant and 
the ivory trade were considered. For this study, the following proposals and working documents 
will be discussed: 
 CoP 17 Proposals 14, 15 and 16. 
 CoP 17 Documents 84.1, 84.2 and 84.3. 
 CoP 17 Documents 57.2 and 27. 
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4.3.1. CoP 17 Proposals 14, 15 and 16 - Consideration of proposals for amendment of 
Appendices I and II 
 
4.3.1.1. CoP 17 Proposal 14 – Proposed by Namibia 
Namibia put forward a proposal to continue to trade in elephant ivory.435 As discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this study, the four range States [one of which is Namibia] have their elephant 
populations listed under Appendix II of the Convention.436 The Appendix II listing contains an 
annotation that is also commonly referred to as the “moratorium” on ivory trade, and prevented 
the four range States from submitting proposals to CITES to trade in ivory until the year 
2017.437 With the moratorium due to end soon, Namibia sought to “delete the annotation to the 
listing of the Namibian African elephant population in Appendix II by deleting any reference 
to Namibia in that annotation.”438 By doing so, Namibia became eligible to submit proposals 
to CITES to once again trade in ivory. 
 
The proposal aimed to “establish a regular form of controlled trade in all elephant specimens, 
including ivory” – to support elephant conservation.439 In support of their argument, Namibia’s 
proposal stated that their growing elephant populations became a nuisance to rural 
communities, as elephants occupied land that communities were dependent on for farming.440 
According to the proposal, the Namibian elephant population had increased from 7500 in 1995 
to over 20 000 at the time of the CoP 17 meeting.441 Namibia also had a National ivory stockpile 
that grew at a rate of 4.5 percent a year.442 As a proponent of the trade, Namibia argued that 
the international trade in elephant ivory would raise much-needed funds for conservation.443 
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Their proposal stated that the only way the Namibian elephant population would be able to 
survive long-term, was if they are of value to communities.444 
 
4.3.1.2. CoP 17 Proposal 15 – Proposed by Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s proposal, much like Namibia’s, sought to amend the Appendix II listing of its 
African elephant population.445 Zimbabwe is one of the four range States named in the 
annotation to the Appendix II listing that were subject to the moratorium on ivory trade. 
Therefore, it too proposed deleting any reference to Zimbabwe contained in the annotation to 
the listing.446 The proposal aimed to establish “regular open market sales of elephant ivory to 
fund management and enforcement actions.”447  
 
The basis of the argument in Zimbabwe’s proposal was that after their elephant population was 
listed under Appendix II in 1997, it was assumed that the country would be able to continue to 
trade in ivory.448 However, due to the moratorium on ivory trade, Zimbabwe was prevented 
from conducting further sales of ivory.449 Zimbabwe viewed the inability to trade in ivory as 
being detrimental to the survival of their elephant populations – since there was no longer an 
incentive to conserve elephants.450 In supporting this argument, the proposal provided an 
example of the Zimbabwean crocodile and how the legal trade in specimens of the crocodile 
has “destroyed the illegal trade”.451 
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4.3.1.3. CoP 17 Proposal 16 – Proposed by Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka and 
Uganda 
The four African elephant populations not included under Appendix I were the populations of 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe – which are listed under Appendix II of the 
Convention.452 However, many States supported Proposal 16 to transfer all African elephant 
populations from Appendix II of CITES, to Appendix I.453 The proponents of Proposal 16 
argued that in light of the continental decline of African elephants, the species as a whole met 
the biological criteria for an Appendix I listing.454  
The relevant criteria areas were:  
“C. A marked decline in the population size in the wild, which has been either: 
i) observed as ongoing or as having occurred in the past (but with a potential to resume); or 
ii) inferred or projected on the basis of any one of the following: 
– a decrease in area of habitat; 
– a decrease in quality of habitat; 
– levels or patterns of exploitation; 
– a high vulnerability to either intrinsic or extrinsic factors; or 
– a decreasing recruitment.”455 
According to the proposal, data from the African Elephant Database (AED) showed a 
continental decline in African elephant populations of 15 percent between 2006 and 2013.456 
Prior to this period, intense poaching during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in rapid population 
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declines.457 The African elephant population therefore continued to remain in a constant state 
of decline – primarily due to poaching which was projected to continue unless something was 
done.458 The proposal also addressed the other factors listed under criterion C and justified how 
the outstanding African elephant populations qualified for an Appendix I listing in terms of the 
above biological criteria. 
 
The proposal thus aimed to unify all African elephant populations under one listing, which 
would eradicate any confusion regarding the ivory trade.459 The continued split-listing of the 
African elephant population was considered “difficult to enforce, sustained demand for ivory, 
provided an incentive to stockpile poached ivory and enabled laundering.”460  
 
4.3.1.4. Discussion 
At the CoP 17 meeting, it was decided by the Chair that proposals 14, 15 and 16 would be 
considered together by the Parties.461 There were discussions in favour of and against the trade 
in ivory. Several State Parties – The Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa – favoured proposals 14 and 15.462 
These Parties supported the trade in ivory with the main reason being that the trade provided 
funding that would supposedly be used for elephant conservation.463 Other reasons for 
supporting these proposals were that rural communities would be able to benefit from the 
sustainable-use of the species, and that good elephant management should be rewarded.464 
Other Parties, including the European Union and its 28 members, India, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Rwanda and the United States of America all opposed proposals 14 and 15.465 They opposed 
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them on the basis that the recent poaching crisis had severely crippled elephant populations, 
and allowing any further trade in ivory would only perpetuate the problem.466 
 
The proposals were thereafter put to a vote. Proposal 14 was the first to be voted on, with 
Zimbabwe requesting that Parties vote using a secret ballot.467 The result of the vote indicated 
that 27 Parties were in favour of the proposal, 100 were against and 9 Parties abstained from 
voting.468 The result was that the proposal was rejected.469 Parties thereafter voted on Proposal 
15, which Zimbabwe also requested be conducted by secret ballot.470 The result of the vote was 
that 21 Parties voted in favour of the proposal, 107 against and 11 Parties abstained from 
voting.471 The proposal therefore was also rejected.472 
 
At the next session, Parties discussed Proposal 16, which gained the support of several Parties 
to the Convention, including Botswana, Côte d’ Ivoire, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Jordan, The 
Syrian Arab Republic, and various other organisations.473 The proposal was a bold move by 
trade opponents who argued that a total ban on the sale of ivory is the only way to ensure the 
safety of elephant populations.474 Though many CITES members joined the movement to ban 
the sale of ivory, there were a few Parties that opposed the ban which an Appendix I listing 
would provide. These opposing Parties included Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Brazil, China 
and the European Union – together with its member States.475 The main justification for their 
opposition was that the African elephant did not meet the biological criteria for an Appendix I 
listing, as claimed in the proposal.476 Another reason for opposing the proposal is that several 
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Parties were fearful of other pro-trade Parties like South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
entering “reservations”477 against the trade restrictions imposed on the ivory trade.478 By 
entering a reservation, the Party is thereafter regarded as a State that is not a Party to the 
Convention, when it comes to trade in the particular species.479 In Proposal 14, Namibia openly 
declared that it would enter a reservation against the ivory trade restrictions and would continue 
to trade in ivory.480 Parties present at the meeting reasoned that if Namibia [and other pro-trade 
Parties] were to enter the reservation, it would be treated as a non-Party for the purposes of 
trading in ivory, and would no longer be bound by the ivory trade restrictions imposed by the 
Convention. In this instance, elephant populations would be more vulnerable to the threats of 
poaching and over-exploitative trade. Parties therefore took heed of the Namibian statement 
and reluctantly opposed the proposal to unify all African elephants under Appendix I of the 
Convention, because of fear that Namibia [and other pro-trade Parties] might enter a 
reservation against the ivory trade. 
  
At the end of the session, Parties were called upon to cast their votes on Proposal 16. The result 
of the vote indicated that 62 Parties were in favour of the proposal, 71 against and 12 abstained 
from voting altogether.481 The proposal was therefore rejected.  
 
4.3.2. CoP 17 Documents 84.1, 84.2 and 84.3 – Decision-making mechanism for a process 
of trade in ivory 
At the 14th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 14) in 2007, South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana agreed to the nine-year moratorium on ivory trade.482 However, part 
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of the agreement also included the development of a decision-making mechanism (DMM) for 
“a process of trade in ivory”.483 The decision to develop a DMM was initially adopted as 
Decision 14.77.484 The purpose of the DMM was to provide a set of rules and procedures for 
any future trade in ivory that would be sanctioned by CITES.485 The process of developing a 
DMM should have been completed by the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 
16) in 2013 – but this did not occur.486 Decision 14.77, which was initially adopted during CoP 
14, was therefore amended at CoP 16 and adopted as Decision 16.55. According to Decision 
16.55, a working group was established to continue developing the DMM – which would be 
presented for approval at CoP 17.487 However, the working group was also unable to conclude 
its work in time for CoP 17 – resulting in many Parties questioning whether the mandate to 
continue developing the DMM should, once again, be extended.488 
 
Various working documents were submitted both in favour of and against extending the 
mandate to develop the DMM. Parties in favour of extending the DMM believed that it would 
establish a system for Parties to trade in ivory legally.489 These Parties were predominantly 
southern African range States that intended to continue trading in ivory. Parties against 
extending the mandate believed that developing the DMM was counter-productive to efforts to 
reduce the demand for ivory.490 Developing a DMM to facilitate the trade of ivory implies there 
will be an international ivory trade in future, which many Parties believe will send the wrong 
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message to the international community.491 The proposals regarding the DMM and whether or 
not the mandate to continue developing it was extended will be discussed below. 
 
4.3.2.1. CoP 17 Doc. 84.1 – Report by the Standing Committee 
The CITES Standing Committee was responsible for monitoring the progress of the DMM 
working group at each of its meetings.492 At the 66th meeting of the Standing Committee, it was 
established that the working group could not conclude its work on the DMM.493 Various Parties 
such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Kenya submitted a proposal to the Committee to 
recommend that it seek advice from the Parties at CoP 17, as to whether it should extend its 
mandate under Decision 16.55 to continue developing the DMM.494 The Standing Committee 
agreed with the proposal to seek advice at the CoP 17 meeting, and by virtue of this working 
document, invited the Conference of the Parties to determine whether the mandate should be 
extended.495 
 
4.3.2.2. CoP 17 Doc. 84.2 – Proposed by Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger and Senegal 
Proponents of this document recommended that the Conference of the Parties not extend the 
mandate to develop a DMM.496 The basis for their argument was that when the concept was 
initially agreed upon in 2007, the circumstances regarding the African elephant population 
were different – in the sense that the population has declined severely since then.497 Since the 
process of developing a DMM was delayed, Parties needed to consider the status of the African 
elephant population at the time of the meeting when deciding whether to extend the mandate. 
The proposal suggested that in light of the poaching crisis and rapidly declining elephant 
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populations, it would not make sense to pursue the development of a mechanism that is market-
driven.498 The existence of such a mechanism pointed to the possibility of future international 
trade in ivory, and would send mixed signals to the international community.499 Ending the 
mandate would also have saved CITES considerable resources that could be used elsewhere.500  
 
4.3.2.3. CoP 17 Doc. 84.3 – Proposed by Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe submitted this proposal and noted their concern that the 
DMM was yet to be finalised.501 They argued that when they agreed to the nine-year 
moratorium in 2007, part of the compromise was the development of a DMM for a process of 
trade in ivory.502 However, in light of the DMM working group’s failure to progress with the 
mandate – Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe prepared a DMM for a process of trade in 
ivory to be considered at CoP 17.503 They considered the failure to progress with the DMM as 
negatively affecting their conservation needs and objectives, as they relied on the revenue 
generated from the sale of ivory.504 The proposal recommended that the CoP consider the 
failure to develop a DMM within the agreed timeframe, as being contrary to the spirit of their 
original agreement and infringing on their rights as Parties to the Convention.505 They also 
recommended that the CoP consider adopting their DMM suggestion, failing which they would 
consider the annotation to the Appendix II listing [moratorium on ivory trade] as pro non 
scripto [as though it had not been written].506 
 
 
                                                          
498 CITES ‘Decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory: Submitted by Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger and Senegal’, CoP 17 2016, Working Documents 
submitted by Parties, available at https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E-CoP17-84-
02.pdf , accessed on 18 October 2017 3. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid at 5. 
501 CITES ‘Decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory: Submitted by Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe’, CoP 17 2016, Working Documents submitted by Parties, available at 
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E-CoP17-84-03.pdf, accessed on 18 October 2017 
3. 
502 Ibid at 1. 
503 Ibid at 2. 
504 Ibid at 4. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Ibid. 
 
 
62 
 
4.3.2.4. Discussion 
At CoP 17, the Secretariat suggested that the Parties discuss all three documents together.507 
Parties opposing the development of the DMM believed it would be inappropriate to continue 
discussions to develop a trading system when elephant populations are in decline.508 South 
Africa led Parties in favour of the DMM to adopt the DMM created by Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe.509 This effort did not go unnoticed by the international community, as South 
Africa and its supporting range States made it clear they would not support ending the mandate 
to develop a DMM.510 These States believed that refusing to adopt the DMM was against their 
best interests, and if Parties chose not to adopt the mechanism they would disregard the trade 
exceptions to which they initially agreed.511 This bold statement made it clear that South Africa 
and its supporting range States intended re-opening the international trade in ivory and would 
not support any proposals to institute a total ban. 
 
After discussing the documents at the meeting, the Chair realised that the Parties had failed to 
reach consensus on what form of action should to be taken regarding the DMM.512 He thereafter 
called for a vote on each document – to decide whether its recommendations would be accepted 
or rejected.513 The Parties first voted on CoP 17 Doc. 84.2, and the results of the vote indicated 
there were 44 Parties in favour of the recommendation and 45 against, while 11 Parties 
abstained from voting.514 The recommendation was therefore rejected, which meant that the 
mandate to continue developing a DMM for a process of trade in ivory would not be 
extended.515 Parties thereafter voted on CoP 17 Doc. 84.3, which South Africa requested be 
conducted by secret ballot.516 The result of the vote indicated that 21 Parties were in favour of 
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the recommendations, 76 were against, and 13 Parties abstained from voting.517 Therefore, with 
the secret ballot, even more of the Parties rejected the recommendation to adopt the DMM 
developed by South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.518 The decision by the Parties to reject 
the development of a DMM showed that the vast majority of States were opposed to the idea 
of re-opening the trade in ivory  
 
4.3.3 CoP 17 Doc. 57.2 and CoP 17 Doc. 27 – Closure of domestic markets for elephant ivory 
 
4.3.3.1. CoP 17 Doc. 57.2 – Proposed by Angola, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d’ Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Niger and Senegal 
Document 52.7 was submitted to the Conference of the Parties, with the aim of adopting a 
resolution that directs all Parties and Non-Parties to close their domestic ivory markets.519 The 
document was submitted in light of the poaching crisis which, to a large extent, was fuelled by 
the illegal ivory trade.520 The proponents were of the opinion that any sales of ivory, including 
those that take place legally within domestic markets, increased the risk of laundering illegal 
ivory fuelled by corruption – and even provided funding for terrorist groups.521 Since CoP 16, 
various political events have taken place, which encouraged the closure of domestic markets.522 
On 14 February 2014, the presidents of Botswana, Gabon, Chad, Tanzania, and the Ethiopian 
Minister of Environmental Affairs, launched the Elephant Protection Initiative (EPI), which 
supported the closure of domestic ivory markets.523 On 25 September 2015, former US 
President Barack Obama, together with President Xi Jinping of China, issued statements 
showing their commitment to combating illegal wildlife trafficking, which included banning 
the import and export of ivory.524 On 26 February 2016, the European Union adopted an action 
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plan that focused on closing domestic ivory markets in the European Union.525 The proposal 
mentioned these events to show that various Parties and non-Parties were changing their minds 
when it came to the domestic ivory trade, and were, instead, choosing to encourage closure.526 
However, these efforts alone were not enough to ensure that elephants would no longer be 
exposed to the risks associated with the existence of domestic ivory markets.527 
 
The proposal, therefore, put forward a draft resolution that essentially directed all Parties and 
non-Parties to take all legislative, regulatory and enforcement measures necessary to shut down 
domestic ivory markets.528 
 
4.3.3.2. CoP 17 Doc. 27 – Proposed by the United States of America 
The document submitted by the United States of America was similar to CoP 17 Doc. 57.2. 
However, it urged States to close their domestic ivory markets instead of bluntly directing them 
to shut them down.529 Unlike CoP 17 Doc. 57.2, the document recommended revising the 
existing Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP 16) – rather than adopting a new Resolution. 
Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP 16) addressed the domestic ivory trade and the duties of 
States with domestic ivory markets.530 The proposed revisions contained in the annexure to the 
document urged States to close their domestic markets and to report on their efforts.531 
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4.3.3.3. Discussion 
At the meeting of the Parties, the Secretariat recommended that both documents be considered 
together.532 A small group of African range States – South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe – 
opposed the documents.533 Namibia raised a point of order claiming that the documents did not 
fall within the scope of the Convention, as States hold “permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources”.534 A motion to dismiss discussion on the documents was put to a vote and 
subsequently rejected by the Parties.535 Discussions thereafter continued, and a working group 
was established to further discuss the documents.536 Proponents of the respective documents 
presented a unified proposal to the working group that focused on amending the existing 
Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP 16), by urging States to close their domestic ivory 
markets.537 Although the proposal received a fair amount of support, an important Party, the 
European Union and its member States, was undecided and instead insisted on a ‘qualified’ 
closure of domestic markets.538 Their hesitation to support a complete ban on the domestic 
ivory trade stemmed from their fear of certain range States – such as South Africa, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe – entering reservations against trade restrictions.  
 
Discussions concluded when Parties reached a compromise decision.539 Resolution Conf. 10.10 
(Rev. CoP 16) was revised, and it was decided that all Parties and non-Parties that have 
domestic ivory markets which contribute to poaching or the illegal trade, take all legislative, 
regulatory and enforcement measures to close that market.540 
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4.4. CONCLUSION 
It was clear after discussing the proposals and working documents that Parties to the 
Convention were still divided on the issue of whether to trade in ivory. This was primarily due 
to efforts by a few range States led by South Africa. These States were adamant about re-
opening the international trade in ivory. These States still supported the sustainable-use 
approach to conservation that regards elephants as resources which can be used to derive 
funds.541 The funds are supposedly used for conservation efforts and community 
programmes.542 In this instance, the issue with the sustainable-use approach, is that CITES 
makes no provision for monitoring how States enforce Convention measures.543 This includes 
the manner in which certain range States such as South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, 
conserve their elephant populations, as well as whether these States actually use the revenue 
from the sale of ivory toward conserving elephant populations. These Parties therefore have 
sovereign control over the resources allocated to elephant conservation.544 According to Jung, 
many of the above-mentioned African countries have little incentive to conserve elephant 
populations, as the benefits derived from the sale of ivory are far more beneficial.545 As 
developing countries, their priorities are different, and wildlife management often suffers as a 
result.546 It is therefore questionable whether CITES should permit any future sale of ivory, as 
there is little provision for monitoring how the revenue from these sales is utilised. This is 
especially important in light of the continuing global decline in African elephant populations.  
 
Moreover, the idea that communities should be allowed to benefit from the trade in ivory, was 
debated at CoP 17. Community programmes provide incentives to protect elephants; however, 
human-elephant conflict sometimes results in rural communities turning a blind eye to 
poaching.547 At the meeting, India stated from its own experiences with Asian elephants, that 
there are alternative methods of advancing community programmes – without resorting to 
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trading in ivory.548 In most cases, the negative impact on elephants greatly outweighs the 
benefit of funding community programmes.549 This is because African elephants are viewed as 
resources by the States within which they reside – to be used consumptively rather than being 
protected as keystone species.550 This results in elephants being exploited and the revenue 
generated is used toward community development programmes, rather than being allocated to 
improving other conservation measures.551 According to Lindsay, there is little evidence to 
indicate that the community development programmes have greatly improved conservation or 
the lives of community members, and it must therefore be asked why southern African range 
States place such a large focus on furthering community development at the expense of their 
own elephant populations.552 It is also important to consider that the extensive funds used to 
import and export ivory, secure ivory stockpiles, fund anti-poaching and law-enforcement 
efforts, greatly outweigh funds derived from the sale of ivory.553 
 
Instead of re-opening the ivory trade to raise funds for conservation, States should instead use 
their limited resources to preserve elephant populations.554 This would eliminate costs 
associated with securing stockpiles and importing or exporting ivory. Enacting a ban on all 
trade in ivory would reduce demand, which would, in turn, reduce poaching and the amount of 
resources required to combat poaching.555 In a surprising turn of events, Botswana showed its 
support for CoP 17 Proposal 16, which proposed listing all elephant populations under 
Appendix I.556 Like many other Parties to the Convention, Botswana recognised that African 
elephant populations are in crisis, and therefore was opposed to re-opening the ivory trade.557 
Although CoP 17 Proposal 16 was rejected, the level of support it achieved is promising, and 
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shows that the international community is moving toward a preservationist approach to 
conservation.558 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Only when the last of the animals’ horns, tusks, skin and bones have been sold, will 
mankind realise that money cannot buy back our wildlife.”559 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
Following the discussion on CoP 17, this chapter discusses how the decisions that were taken 
at the meeting are likely to impact on ivory trade in South Africa. The chapter begins by briefly 
summarising the outcomes of the CoP 17 meeting, and this is followed by a discussion of the 
state of affairs in South Africa. In doing so, the chapter will discuss South Africa’s approach 
to the ivory trade, its prospects for future trade, and how the South African elephant population 
is likely to be affected by the decisions made at CoP 17. The chapter will then make limited 
recommendations to improve the structure of South Africa’s legislative framework regulating 
the ivory trade. To conclude, the chapter will discuss the effectiveness of CITES in being able 
to regulate the trade in ivory. This discussion briefly summarises the Convention’s 
shortcomings and deficiencies that were identified throughout the dissertation – and makes 
limited recommendations on how to improve them.  
 
5.2. SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES OF CoP 17  
CoP 17 took place at an important juncture for the elephant ivory trade. With increased levels 
of poaching being reported and the moratorium on the ivory trade drawing to an end, the 
decisions made at CoP 17 were crucial for ensuring the survival of the African elephant.560 At 
the meeting, proposals in favour of and against the ivory trade were submitted.561 The outcomes 
of these proposals were as follows: 
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5.2.1. Amendments to appendices 
Proposals were submitted by Namibia and Zimbabwe to be able to continue to trade elephant 
ivory.562 The proponents argued that funds derived from the sale of ivory would be required to 
fund conservation efforts, anti-poaching and enforcement measures, and to secure ivory 
stockpiles and provide incentives for community development programmes.563 However, after 
much debate, the proposals were rejected and both proponents were prevented from concluding 
further ivory sales.564  
 
A further proposal was submitted by various proponents565 to list all African elephant 
populations under Appendix I of the Convention.566 These proponents argued that the African 
elephant meets the biological criteria to be listed.567 If this proposal was accepted – it would 
mean that the populations of certain pro-trade countries such as South Africa, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, would have to be listed under Appendix I, along with all other 
African elephant populations. However, the above-mentioned pro-trade countries vehemently 
opposed the proposal and threatened to take reservations against it if it was accepted.568 Despite 
vast support for the proposal, the threat of pro-trade countries taking reservations against the 
listing swayed Parties decisions to reject the proposal.569 
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5.2.2. Decision-making mechanism (DMM) for a process of trade in ivory 
Working documents were submitted at the CoP 17 meeting regarding the DMM for a process 
of trade in ivory. The purpose of the DMM was to provide a set of rules and procedures to 
regulate any future trade in ivory that is sanctioned by CITES.570 The DMM was initially agreed 
upon at CoP 14 in 2007 and was due to be completed at CoP 16 in 2013.571 However, the failure 
to progress with the DMM resulted in Parties questioning whether or not the mandate to 
continue developing the DMM should be extended at CoP 17.  
 
One working document was submitted by various proponents572 to end the mandate to develop 
a DMM.573 The proponents of this working document argued that the status of the African 
elephant population had changed considerably since 2007, when the decision to develop the 
DMM was first adopted.574 Since then, the African elephant population had suffered drastic 
declines. It therefore would not make sense to continue developing a DMM intended on 
facilitating a trade [ivory trade].575 Continuing to develop a DMM would point to the possibility 
of future trade in ivory, and send mixed signals to the international community.576  
 
A further working document was submitted by South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which 
favoured the development of a DMM.577 The proponents of this working document argued that 
the failure to develop a DMM negatively impacted their conservation needs, as they rely on the 
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revenue derived from the sale of ivory to fund conservation efforts.578 The document therefore 
proposed adopting a DMM prepared by South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe – failing which, 
these Parties would disregard the agreement to institute a moratorium on ivory trade.579 After 
much discussion and a lack of consensus among the Parties present, the matter was put to a 
vote. It was decided that the mandate to continue developing a DMM would not be extended.580 
 
5.2.3. Closure of domestic ivory markets  
Two working documents were put forward proposing the closure of domestic ivory markets. 
The first working document was put forward by various proponents581 and proposed that all 
Parties to the Convention take the necessary legislative, regulatory and enforcement measures 
to shut down their domestic ivory markets.582 The proponents argued that any sale of ivory, 
including the domestic ivory trade, fuels poaching and the illegal trade of ivory.583  
 
A second working document was put forward by the United States of America, with a similar 
purpose to the afore-mentioned working document.584 After discussing both documents at the 
meeting, a working group was established to further discuss the topic.585 Once discussed, both 
working documents were combined into a single document and a compromise was reached.586 
The working group recommended that all Parties and non-Parties with a domestic ivory market 
that contributes to poaching or the illegal ivory trade, should take all legislative, regulatory and 
enforcement measures to close that market.587 
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By the end of the CoP 17 meeting, the status of the African elephant remained, for the most 
part, unchanged. There were, however, a few improvements made, which leant toward ensuring 
the survival of the species. These improvements included: rejecting proposals to continue to 
trade in ivory, ending the DMM for a process of trade in ivory, and recommending that 
domestic markets that contribute to illegal trade and poaching, be closed.588 The decisions made 
at CoP 17 therefore represented a step in the right direction – to be able to ensure the survival 
of the African elephant. It must also be noted that the Parties were becoming increasingly aware 
of the negative impact that the legal and illegal ivory trade had on the African elephant 
population. The one-off sales of ivory in 1999 and 2008, despite being legal, were believed to 
increase the levels of poaching and illegal trade that took place.589 This was mainly due to the 
fact that the legal sales provided opportunities to easily launder ivory.590 It is clear that the 
illegal trade of ivory negatively impacts elephant populations, however, more and more Parties 
began noticing that the legal ivory trade, although providing much needed funds, is also 
counter-productive to the very conservation efforts that are made by using those funds. It does 
not make sense for the CoP to approve requests by Southern African Parties to conclude one-
off ivory sales, which only worsens the situation on the ground and results in more and more 
funding being required to improve conservation measures. This is an unending cycle which can 
be avoided by disallowing any further trade in ivory.  
 
Unfortunately, there are a few pro-trade countries such as South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, standing in the way of a unified Appendix I listing for all African elephant 
populations.591 For now though, the possibility of any future trade in African elephant ivory 
has been denied.592 It is necessary for the survival of elephant populations that the Parties, 
instead, focus on implementing the decisions made at CoP 17, by taking steps to enact or amend 
legislation and establish the requisite enforcement measures.593 
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5.3. IMPACT OF CoP 17 DECISIONS ON IVORY TRADE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.3.1. South Africa’s approach to the elephant ivory trade at CoP 17 
South Africa played a major role at the CoP 17 meeting. Aside from being the host nation, 
South Africa was an influential Party to decisions relating to the elephant ivory trade. As a pro-
trade country that supports a sustainable-use approach to the conservation of its elephant 
populations, South Africa supported CoP 17 Proposals 14 and 15 to continue to trade in 
ivory.594 South Africa also led the opposition against listing the African elephant under 
Appendix I of the Convention and put forward a DMM for a process of trade in ivory.595 By 
supporting all the proposals intended on continuing to trade in ivory, South Africa made its 
position clear as a pro-trade country. Despite Proposals 14 and 15 being rejected, and the 
mandate to continue developing a DMM being terminated, South Africa’s Minister of 
Environmental Affairs at the time, Edna Molewa, considered the meeting to have been a 
success for “science-based decision-making in the interests of species conservation.”596 The 
Minister also mentioned that the role of CITES is to regulate trade in endangered species and 
is not to operate as an anti-trade movement.597 These statements by the Ministry further 
enforced South Africa’s position as a pro-trade nation in respect of the ivory trade.   
 
5.3.2. Prospects for future trade  
The decisions made at CoP 17 reflected a need to further safeguard African elephant 
populations.598 All proposals aimed at any future trade of ivory were therefore rejected.599 As 
a Party to CITES, South Africa is obligated to implement and abide by the decisions made at 
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each meeting of the Parties.600 Therefore, South Africa cannot conclude any international sales 
of ivory until CoP 18, to be held in Sri Lanka in 2019601 – when it will once again be able to 
petition CITES to be allowed to trade elephant ivory. 
 
5.3.3. How are South Africa’s elephant populations likely to be affected by CoP 17 decisions?  
The decisions made at CoP 17 are likely to have a positive impact on South Africa’s elephant 
populations. The highly contested decisions to deny further sales of ivory and to end the 
development of a DMM, will ensure that legal sales of ivory do not threaten continental 
elephant populations.602 Many Parties believe that any legal trade in ivory provides a 
camouflage for illegal ivory to be laundered.603 This, in turn, results in increased levels of 
poaching.604 Since the prospects for future trade were rejected at CoP 17, illegal ivory will 
become more and more difficult to launder – which will lead to fewer incidents of poaching 
and allow elephant populations to recover.605 This includes South Africa’s elephant population, 
which has recently been exposed to increased levels of poaching.606  
 
Furthermore, the agreement to close domestic markets that contribute to poaching or the illegal 
ivory trade will also be a vital to tool prevent further population loss.607 With regard to South 
Africa, its domestic ivory trade is already regulated by national legislation,608 however, its 
reported worrying involvement in the illegal ivory trade indicates that the effectiveness of 
existing legislation may need to be reviewed.609 
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In the build-up to CoP 17, the international community was made aware of the continental 
decline in the African elephant population.610 Poaching was cited as being the main reason for 
the decline.611 Aware of the circumstances surrounding African elephant populations, the 
Parties were careful not to take any decisions that would contribute to further population loss, 
such as allowing any legal trade in ivory. Instead, Parties focused on combating the illegal trade 
of ivory and introducing stricter enforcement measures to safeguard the African elephant.612  
 
5.3.4. Improvements to existing legislation to ensure effective implementation of CITES  
Chapter two, Part two, of this dissertation discussed the international legal regime regulating 
the ivory trade and how this translates into South African domestic law. According to Couzens, 
South Africa uses three different approaches when deciding how to incorporate international 
environmental conventions into South African domestic law.613 These three approaches are 
best described by Couzens as follows: Firstly, “wholesale importation” which entails directly 
incorporating a convention into South African domestic law.614 Secondly, “implementation by 
incorporation of principles” which entails the South African government putting in place 
legislation that incorporates principles from international law and international treaties.615 
Thirdly, “implementation through parallel or related legislation” which entails South Africa 
ratifying an international agreement and relying on existing legislation with a similar objective 
and purpose to fulfil its obligation to incorporate the agreement into domestic law.616 The 
approach used by South Africa to incorporate CITES is the “implementation through parallel 
or related legislation” approach.617 In terms of this approach, South Africa ratified CITES, but 
did not directly incorporate its provisions into domestic law.618 Instead, South Africa used an 
indirect approach by relying on existing legislation619 with a similar objective and purpose, to 
fulfil its obligation to incorporate CITES into domestic law.620 These laws, however, do not 
                                                          
610 CITES Press Release ‘African elephants still in decline due to high levels of poaching’, 2016, CITES.org, 
available at 
https://cites.org/eng/news/pr/african_elephants_still_in_decline_due_to_high_levels_of_poaching_03032016, 
accessed on 2 May 2016. 
611 Ibid. 
612 CITES Press Release (note 598 above). 
613 Couzens (note 273 above) at 129. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid at 143. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Existing legislation primarily being the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
620 Couzens (note 273 above) at 143. 
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directly incorporate CITES – and were not enacted for the sole purpose of implementing its 
provisions.621  
 
According to Couzens, the approach used by South Africa to incorporate an international 
agreement is to a large extent indicative of the governments thinking on certain environmental 
issues.622 For instance, if the South African Government is pro-active on a particular 
environmental issue such as protecting the marine environment from pollution, it will directly 
incorporate the international agreement committed to that particular endeavour into South 
African domestic law. This was the case when South Africa incorporated the MARPOL 
Convention623 into domestic law by enacting the Marine Pollution (Prevention of pollution 
from ships) Act 1986624 (MARPOL Act).625 On the other hand, if the South African 
Government does not want to fully commit itself to fulfilling the obligations of a particular 
international agreement, it will take a cautious approach when incorporating such agreement 
into domestic law.626 This was the case when the South African Government used the 
“implementation through parallel or related legislation” approach to incorporate CITES into 
domestic law.627 This approach was the most indirect of the three above-mentioned approaches 
and allowed the South African Government the flexibility it needed to not over-commit itself 
to the provisions of CITES. Although this ensures that the South African Government 
maintains control over its natural resources, it is not the most effective approach to adopt when 
it comes to conserving the African elephant. The fact that South Africa relies on existing 
legislation to fulfil its obligations under CITES means that there is no central legislative 
authority incorporating the provisions of CITES into South African domestic law. The absence 
of a central legislative authority affects South Africa’s ability to effectively implement CITES 
and leads to various other deficiencies, examples of which will be discussed as follows:  
 
                                                          
621 Torpy (note 157 above) at 63. 
622 Couzens (note 273 above) at 128. 
623 The International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted on 2 
November 1973 at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and is the main convention covering 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. Available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-prevention-
of-pollution-from-ships-(marpol).aspx, accessed on 10 December 2018.  
624 South Africa, Marine Pollution (Prevention of pollution from ships) Act 2, 1986. 
625 Couzens (note 273 above) at 132. 
626 Ibid at 128. 
627 Ibid at 143. 
78 
 
The lack of a central legislative authority affects South Africa’s ability to effectively carry out 
its duties under CITES, such as reporting consistently to the Elephant Trade Information 
System (ETIS)628 on ivory seizures. The submission of data of ivory seizures to ETIS is crucial 
to be able to monitor elephant populations. At the CoP 17 meeting, a report on the ETIS, 
administered by CITES, indicated that South Africa had a poor rule of law score based on the 
World Bank governance indicator629 for measuring the  rule of law.630 In terms of the report, 
South Africa was considered as a country with “problematic governance values.”631 In addition, 
the ETIS report indicated that South Africa was classified as a “country of secondary 
concern.”632 South Africa received this classification due to its poor record for submitting ivory 
seizure data to ETIS – primarily due to the failure of most provinces to submit data for ivory 
seizures - and the lack of a centralised reporting system.633  
 
It is important for South Africa to be consistent with providing data of ivory seizures to ETIS. 
Doing so would ensure that ETIS will be able to effectively monitor South Africa’s elephant 
populations and collect valuable data about the trade of ivory in South Africa. However, South 
Africa’s current legislation is not tailored to the specifications of CITES and does not make 
provision for a central reporting authority to ensure that its obligation to provide the necessary 
data to ETIS is fulfilled. Enacting legislation that directly incorporates CITES into South 
African domestic law would, therefore, create a central legislative authority with the ability to 
create mechanisms that would effectively fulfil its obligations under CITES.  
 
The lack of a central legislative authority also impacts the way that South Africa chooses to 
manage its natural resources, such as the African elephant. Despite much of the world’s nations 
beginning to view the African elephant as more than a resource for financial gain, South Africa 
                                                          
628 The Elephant Trade Information System is one of two monitoring systems for elephants under CITES. At 
each meeting of the Conference of the Parties, a comprehensive report of the ETIS data is provided and 
discussed.  
629 World Bank Governance Indicator – Rule of Law – “The rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” 
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2018. 
630 CITES ‘Report on the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS)’, CoP 17 2016, available at 
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E-CoP17-57-06-R1.pdf, accessed on 5 November 
2017 16. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid at 21. 
633 Ibid.  
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still views it as such. This may prove problematic for Southern African elephant populations. 
By not directly incorporating CITES into its domestic law, South Africa is able to maintain 
control of its elephant populations. However, it must be noted that South Africa’s decisions on 
the way that it manages its elephant populations also affects the continental elephant 
population. According to Harvey, Southern African elephant populations [Botswana, South 
Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe] account for more than 50 per cent of the total continental 
elephant population.634 Other regions such as West and Central Africa are among the worst 
affected by the threat of poaching and thus have smaller elephant populations.635 Once 
elephants become much scarcer in these regions, poaching syndicates will become more likely 
to target the remaining Southern African elephant populations which have already begun 
declining. According to the South African National Parks (SANparks), elephant poaching is on 
the rise at the Kruger National Park and is fuelled by the illegal wildlife trade.636 As a country 
that is pro-trade, South Africa needs to take into consideration the consequences of legalising 
the ivory trade and retaining its Appendix II listing for elephants under CITES. The potential 
for trade to resume is enough to remove any stigma that would have been attached to the trade 
of ivory thereby, igniting the demand for ivory and fuelling the illegal trade.637 Although South 
Africa’s elephant populations are stable for now, if the domestic legislation is not improved, 
elephant populations may rapidly decline in future. Specific legislation, directly incorporating 
CITES would strengthen South Africa’s legal framework in terms of ensuring the survival of 
the African elephant.  
 
South Africa’s current domestic legislation is outdated because it relies on parallel legislation, 
as opposed to enacting specific legislation that directly incorporates CITES. It is not to say that 
the current legislation is ineffective, but there is significant room for improvement. The acts 
and ordinances, as discussed in chapter 3, that give effect to CITES were not enacted for the 
sole purpose of incorporating CITES and are at times lacking in certain aspects that were 
discussed in the abovementioned paragraphs. The changing landscape in elephant conservation 
requires that South Africa’s legislation evolves to meet new challenges. A typical example of 
                                                          
634 Harvey, R. ‘Preserving the African elephant for future generations’ (SAIIA Occasional Paper 219; 2015) 7. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Africa News Agency (ANA) ‘Elephant poaching on the rise – South African National Parks’, 2016, Mail and 
Guardian Online, available at https://mg.co.za/article/2016-06-06-00-elephant-poaching-on-the-rise-south-
african-national-parks/, accessed on 17 October 2016. 
637 Harvey (note 634 above) at 7. 
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this is the fact that poaching syndicates are becoming more and more sophisticated and are 
constantly seeking new targets. Unless the legislation is updated to meet these new challenges 
of the changing landscape, South Africa’s elephants may not be able to be protected. 
  
5.4. EFFECTIVENESS OF CITES IN REGULATING THE IVORY TRADE 
CITES plays a vital role in ensuring that the ivory trade does not threaten the survival of the 
African elephant in the wild.638 However, there are a few deficiencies that severely impact the 
effectiveness of the Convention. Each of these deficiencies is discussed below.  
 
5.4.1. Implementation of the Convention by State Parties 
Chapter two of this dissertation discussed CITES and the manner in which it is applied by its 
member States. This dissertation observed that CITES is a non-self-executing treaty that relies 
entirely on member States to implement its provisions by enacting national legislation.639 The 
implementation of the Convention therefore differs from State to State, which results in varied 
enforcement procedures and penalties. This lack of standardised application of the Convention 
severely impacts its effectiveness.640 
 
Another observation was that several member States had not implemented the Convention, or 
chose to only partially implement it within their legislative framework.641 It should also be 
noted that CITES makes no provision for ongoing monitoring to ensure that member States 
have adequately implemented and are enforcing its provisions – nor does it penalise non-
compliant States.642 
 
CITES effectiveness as a wildlife trade-regulating Convention is largely dependent upon the 
national legislation implementing it.643 To improve its effectiveness, CITES needs to create a 
                                                          
638 Barrie (note 20 above) at 189. 
639 Fiadjoe (note 220 above) at 38. 
640 Torpy (note 157 above) at 67. 
641 Fiadjoe (note 220 above) at 39. 
642 Barrie (note 20 above) at 182. 
643 Panjabi (note 6 above) at 17. 
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body to monitor Parties more closely and encourage them to comply with their obligation to 
implement the Convention.644 CITES must also provide explicit guidelines regarding the form 
and content of the national legislation that Parties are required to implement.645 This includes 
being specific about enforcement procedures and penalties for contravening the provisions of 
the Convention.646 Since CITES is completely reliant upon member States to implement the 
Convention, it must focus on ensuring that Parties actually do so in a manner that effectively 
fulfils the objective of the Convention. In doing so, these monitoring bodies should offer 
rewards or incentives to countries that comply with their obligation to implement the 
Convention. These incentives or rewards could take the form of financial contributions, 
received from donors internationally, to improve conservation measures. The addition of 
incentives would be especially useful to encourage developing countries to implement CITES.  
 
5.4.2. Conservation approach: Sustainable-use or the Pure-protectionist approach 
Chapter three of this dissertation discussed how past CoP meetings have contributed to shaping 
the international legal regime that regulates the ivory trade. The dissertation observed that 
although decisions made at past CoP meetings made invaluable contributions to the legal 
regime regulating the ivory trade, the Parties present remained divided on how best to conserve 
African elephant populations.647 The division occurred between advocates of a pure-
protectionist approach on the one hand, and supporters of a sustainable-use approach on the 
other.648 This lack of consensus between Parties greatly diminishes the effectiveness of the 
Convention, and has resulted in conservation measures being carried out unevenly among 
African range States.649  
 
The Convention does not specifically favour a single approach, but instead strikes a balance 
between the two approaches.650 However, in order to improve its effectiveness, it is necessary 
for the Convention to be decisive on which approach to adopt in the event that Parties are 
unable to reach consensus. This is especially necessary when populations of a particular 
                                                          
644 Bodansky (note 247 above) at 79. 
645 Ibid at 71. 
646 Torpy (note 157 above) at 67. 
647 Barrie (note 20 above) at 188. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Montazeri (note 19 above) at 122. 
650 Krieps (note 219 above) at 470. 
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species, such as the African elephant, have displayed a steady trend of decline due to the 
wildlife trade.  
 
5.5. CONCLUSION 
It has been almost 42 years since the African elephant was first listed under CITES. The aim 
of the listing was to afford the African elephant protection, under the Convention, from the 
devastating effects of the ivory trade.651 Although CITES succeeded in providing a practical 
mechanism to regulate the ivory trade, this dissertation found member States to be severely 
lacking in the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. It is therefore clear that CITES 
cannot solely rely on Parties to enact legislation giving effect to it. CITES should instead 
establish a body that would take the necessary steps to regularly monitor Parties and ensure 
that they are aware of their duties to implement the provisions of the Convention. In doing so, 
it must provide definitive guidelines as to how Parties should implement and enforce the 
provisions of the Convention. It would also be useful for CITES to make provision for financial 
assistance to be offered to Parties, in order to implement the Convention and reward their 
compliance with incentives to improve conservation measures. It must, however, be noted that 
implementation and enforcement go hand in hand. Without enforcement, it is as if the 
Convention was never implemented.652 It is therefore important that Parties follow up the 
implementation of the Convention with corresponding enforcement mechanisms that fulfil its 
objectives. 
 
CITES should also take a firm stand on the conservation approach needed to conserve African 
elephant populations.653 This dissertation observed that despite the African elephant being 
discussed at several CoP meetings, Parties continue to remain divided on whether to adopt a 
pure-protectionist approach or a sustainable-use approach to conservation. This division among 
the Parties has resulted in contrasting decisions being taken at many CoP meetings, which 
severely impacts the Convention’s ability to effectively regulate the ivory trade. On the one 
hand, by banning all international ivory trade, Parties favoured a pure-protectionist approach 
to conservation. On the other hand, by allowing one-off ivory sales, Parties favoured a 
                                                          
651 Barrie (note 20 above) at 185. 
652 Fiadjoe (note 220 above) at 39. 
653 Hutchens (note 2 above) at 950. 
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sustainable-use approach to conservation. Although each approach has its supporters and 
critics, it is clear that when Parties fail to reach consensus or are at odds, the Convention ought 
to step in to avoid decisions being swayed. This may be done by using the recommendations 
of the Secretariat of the Convention as a “tiebreaker” of sorts – taking into account the objective 
to ensure the survival of African elephant.  
 
The CoP 17 meeting took place at a time when African elephant populations were experiencing 
a severe decline. The decisions taken at this meeting, therefore, were and will remain crucial 
to preventing further population loss. At the meeting, proposals in favour of and against the 
ivory trade were submitted. Ultimately, all proposals in favour of continuing to trade in ivory 
were rejected. The rejection of these proposals was necessary to prevent any legal trade in ivory 
from exacerbating the illegal trade of ivory. The proposal to once again unify all African 
elephants under Appendix I – thereby banning all international trade in ivory – was also 
rejected. For this reason, advocates of a pure-protectionist approach may consider CoP 17 to 
be a missed opportunity to put an end to the possibility of any legal trade in ivory.  An important 
reason why the proposal to unify all African elephant populations under Appendix I failed, is 
because pro-trade countries led by South Africa held Parties to ransom by threatening to 
disregard trade regulations and continue to trade independently of the Convention. This threat 
made Parties fearful of what would become of the African elephant if range States with the 
largest elephant populations chose to no longer be bound by the trade regulations under CITES. 
Parties, therefore, decided to reject the proposal. The decisions taken during this meeting 
therefore constituted Parties “playing it safe” so to speak. No proposals in favour of, nor against 
the trade in ivory were adopted.  
 
South Africa, as previously mentioned, was a highly influential Party during the CoP 17 
meeting, and as a pro-trade nation with stable elephant populations, it sought to continue 
trading in ivory. However, this dissertation observed that South Africa’s legislative framework, 
although successful thus far, may not be adequately equipped to deal with the consequences 
associated with continued trade in ivory. South Africa is considered to have implemented 
CITES within its national legislation, however, it has done so indirectly through pre-existing 
legislation. South Africa’s method of implementation may be considered to be outdated and 
failing to take into consideration the changing landscape. A typical example of the inadequacy 
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of current legislation may be demonstrated by the fact that South Africa was reported to have 
a worrying involvement in the illegal ivory trade.654 Further to this, the country’s Kruger 
National Park, which is home to South Africa’s largest elephant population, recently 
experienced incidents of poaching – which existing enforcement measures were unable to 
prevent.655 South African elephant populations may therefore benefit from updated legislation 
regulating the ivory trade and promoting stricter enforcement measures.  
 
It is therefore imperative that South Africa, as a Party with considerable influence in the trade 
of ivory, re-assess its position regarding its listing of the African elephant under CITES and its 
decision to want to continue trade. South Africa is one of the range States with the largest 
elephant population and as discussed in this chapter, its decisions affect the continental 
population of elephants. Therefore, instead of considering its own population in isolation, the 
South African government should consider the consequences of its decisions on a continental 
scale. In conclusion, it must be taken into account that elephant ivory is a rare natural resource 
that requires protection. Failure to protect this resource will result in over-exploitive trade and 
the eventual extinction of the African elephant as a species. Mankind must therefore make 
every effort to prevent the devastating extinction of yet another majestic species. 
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655 Africa News Agency (ANA) (note 636 above). 
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